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The purpose of the dissertation is to look into the developments in the natural 
gas industry and markets happening on the global and regional level 
approaching from the lens of evolution of long-term contracts that are likely 
to have effects on the country level with regards to natural gas importing and 
exporting countries.  
This dissertation is made up of two essays.  
The first essay using instrumental variables methods, such as: two 
stage least squares (2SLS), generalized method of moments (GMM) and 
limited information likelihood (LIML) regressions empirically explores the 
evolution of the long-term contracts via analysis of the effects of market 
deregulation, technological change, an increase in LNG tanker fleet capacity, 
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global economic recession to the length of the contracts for the sale and 
purchase of natural gas. In this context three models has been formulated. The 
first one analyzes pipeline gas contracts, while the second model looks into 
the liquefied natural gas contracts and the last one deals with both contracts. 
To sum up, overall results indicate that the duration of the contracts tended to 
decrease on average due to occurrence of the aforementioned factors and 
events. The only point is that LNG contracts concluded during the global 
economic recession tend to be longer on average, but more flexible at the 
same time.  
In the second essay, using probit model with endogenous covariate we 
are exploring the LNG market and trade flexibility brought by the ability of 
liquefied natural gas cargo diversion via analysis of the determinants for the 
choice of flexible destination clauses in long-term liquefied natural gas sales 
and purchase agreements. We defined the destination clause as the DES 
delivery terms stipulated in the contracts concluded between the seller 
(exporter) and buyer (importer) of the chilled gas. Therefore, we analyze the 
effect of the factors that are prevalent in the global gas markets - and LNG 
markets in particular - today for the choice of FOB contracts. To sum up, the 
findings clearly imply that the most of the factors, developments and 
unfolding in the current liquefied natural gas markets, industry and value 
chain links favor or affect the choice of more flexible contractual arrangement. 
Furthermore, this trend is likely to be persistent in the mid- and long-term 
further contributing to the overall flexibility of the LNG trade, which in its 
turn is likely to affect the overall flexibility of the global gas markets.   
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To sum up, we believe that the results of quantitative analyses can be 
taken into account during the process of strategy formulation in the gas 
exporting and importing countries as majority of them use long-term contracts 
in the natural gas trade.  
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PART I GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Rationale for the research 
Currently, accounting for about 23% of the world energy demand, natural gas 
is the cleanest and most hydrogen-rich of all the hydrocarbon energy sources. 
It is plentiful as there are discovered, but unexploited resources of natural gas 
all over the globe. (Economides & Wood, 2009) 
Presently paradigm shift is observed in the global energy pricing and 
it very likely the days when crude oil price of 70 USD and higher was the 
norm are behind, leaving uncertainty about possible rebound to historical 
trading ranges. At the same time, the dynamics of the gas industry are also 
changing as new projects come on stream, making significant effect on gas 
hubs’ spot pricing levels and ultimately having profound effects on both 
natural gas exporting and importing countries. 
Shale gas revolution in the US is likely to result in increasing exports 
of liquefied natural gas to various destinations in accordance with long-term, 
short-term and spot contracts adding to the flexibility, liquidity as well as 
spurring further convergence between previously regionally isolated gas 
markets. Notwithstanding bright picture in the short and medium terms, low 
prices may hinder capital investments has to be made for the future supplies 
as demand inevitably is going to pick up in the longer-term under the effect of 
some factors such as the rise in global population.   
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Many of the exporting countries have traditionally resorted to the use 
of long-term contracts for the sale of their natural gas to be able to share risks 
related to the sunk investments made for gas production, processing and 
transportation infrastructure. However, year-on-year increases in supplies 
thanks to monumental investments made during the period of fairly high oil 
and gas prices resulted in new discoveries, shale gas development and 
subsequently many projects (especially LNG terminals) to come on stream in 
a few years. This is likely to result in the claim for more flexible contractual 
arrangements from the buyer’s side. Therefore it is of foremost interest to 
elaborate on the possible evolution path of the contracts by means of 
analyzing empirically to what extent it has already happened. Current anemic 
demand and abundant supply equated to low prices in global gas markets may 
                                                          
1 Source: BP (2016) 
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induce exporter countries to search for new, probably more flexible business 
models and innovative ways of natural resources monetization. 
Another interesting issue is the flexibility in long-term contracts. 
Traditionally, natural gas producers have been resorting to the incorporation 
of various restrictive clauses to the pipeline gas and LNG exports deals. Take-
or-pay clauses requiring the offtake of the predetermined annual volumes and 
destination clauses are the most important of them. While generally 
destination clauses are prohibited in the Continental Europe with reference to 
the breach of 1958 Treaty of Rome norms that require free competition, they 
ceased to be usual business practice in liberalized gas markets of United 
Kingdom or United States. Nevertheless in the other markets organizational 
form still resembles traditional monopolistic structure.  
The development of liquefied natural gas market has made the 
resource mobile in terms of reach to different markets in various regions. 
Common sense tells us that this should have led to price convergence among 
global gas markets as chilled gas volumes are able to be arbitraged between 
various markets, moving from cheaper price regions to markets where they 
are more valuable less transportation costs. But here is the point is that 
destination restrictions are available in the number of the long-term contracts 
for the LNG trade too. They are incorporated in the gas trade deals through 
direct restriction of destination or through resorting to the INCOTERMS rules 
by International Chamber of Commerce. Traditionally, FOB (free on board) 
or DES (delivered ex ship) delivery terms have been used in the LNG sale and 
purchase agreements (SPA) to stipulate which party pays transportation costs, 
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when the title or ownership for the cargo passes on to the buyer etc. In this 
context DES defines that the title and ownership of the cargo passes on to the 
buyer in the destination port. As a result, the incorporation of DES delivery 
term into the LNG trade contract serves as a destination restriction largely 
affecting the flexibility of liquefied natural gas especially in terms of the reach 
of the markets where they need it most at the specific time, i.e. limiting 
arbitraging between markets by the buyer. Therefore we found it interesting to 
look into the factors that affect the choice of destination flexibility in the long-
term LNG contracts as it will be vital for overall flexibility of the global gas 
markets in the future.           
1.2 Research objective 
The purpose of the dissertation is to look into the evolution of long-
term contracts from the perspective of the effect of changing industry 
environment on the duration of the long-term natural gas contracts and factors 
affecting the choice of destination flexibility in the long-term LNG SPAs. We 
argue that both shortening of the long-term gas contracts duration and the 
choice of flexible destination contractual provisions is likely to affect the 
overall flexibility of the regionally disparate gas markets through pushing 
them towards price convergence. Consequently, it might affect the gas 
exporters’ revenue flow stability, demand security and ex-ante and ex-post 
transaction costs such as finding new trade partners, negotiation of terms, 
maladaptation and contract renegotiation. At the same time naturally it is 
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going to open new opportunities for gas importing countries in order to 
benefit from the gas markets flexibility.  
We believe that the results of quantitative analysis would serve as one 
of the references during elaboration of future gas export and import strategies 
as a response to the alterations in the global gas markets.  
1.3 Research questions 
We formulated two main research questions and five sub-questions 
related to the first research question as follows: 
RQ1: What is the effect of changing industry environment on the duration of 
long-term natural gas contracts?  
 RQ 1.1 What is the effect of transition from a monopoly industry 
to competitive market structures in gas industry on the average 
contract duration?  
 RQ 1.2 What is the effect of global economic recession on the 
average duration of LTGC’s? 
 RQ 1.3 What is the effect of absence of the destination clause in 
the LNG contracts on their average duration?  
 RQ 1.4 What is the effect of technological progress on the 
average duration of LTGC’s? 
 RQ 1.5 What is the effect of an increase in the LNG carrier fleet 
size on the average contract duration? 
RQ2: What are the determinants for the choice flexible destination long-term 




The scope of methodologies ranges from qualitative to quantitative 
analysis via utilization of two stage least squares instrumental variable 
regression (2SLS), generalized method of moments (GMM), limited 
information likelihood  estimation (LIML), probit and probit model with 
endogenous covariates (IV probit). 
1.5 Research Contributions 
This study is expected to make several contributions to the research in 
the field of long-term gas contracts. 
Previous literature looked into the issue of long-term contracts from 
the importer’s perspective; however we approach from gas exporter’s side, 
while making brief conclusions for importers too.  
To the best of our knowledge it will be the first empirical study that 
quantitatively analyzes the determinants of the choice of flexible destination 
LNG contracts. Furthermore, we construct the ‘destination clause’ variable by 
means of utilizing the INCOTERMS
2
 2000 to find out whether the availability 
of so called “destination clause” or DES (ex-ship) delivery basis affects the 
contract length compared to more flexible delivery on the FOB basis.  
Then, we quantify the technological change in the LNG industry and 
test the hypothesis related to its effect on length of contracts on average. Also 
                                                          
2  The International Commercial Terms (INCOTERMS) are a series of predefined terms 
published by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) related to international 
commercial law. They are widely used in International commercial transacti-
ons or procurement processes as their use in international sales is encouraged by trade councils, 
courts and international lawyers. 
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we make use of liquefied tanker fleet data to check the effect of growing 
tanker fleet size on the long-term contracts duration and the effect of 
economic recession. 
Moreover, we approach long-term contracts from the perspective of 
means and one of options for fostering energy security and gas demand 
security in particular. 
 Finally, we believe our research outcomes can serve as a departing 
point in the situation assessment on the way of taking strategic decisions by 
the decision-makers in the gas exporting countries.  
1.6 Structure of the dissertation 
            The structure of dissertation is presented in the Table 2.  
 Table 1.2 Dissertation structure 







1 Introduction of 
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PART II LONG-TERM NATURAL GAS 
CONTRACTS EVOLUTION IN THE 
CHANGING INDUSTRY ENVIRONMENT 
Chapter 2 Long-term contracts and natural gas 
pricing 
2.1 Introduction 
Long-term take-or-pay (ToP) contracts tie sellers and buyers for a 
considerable period of time, with strictly defined obligations towards each 
other. Purchasers are required to pay for a pre-specified minimum quantity of 
gas whether or not they actually take the gas, and producers are required to 
deliver this quantity (Crocker & Masten, 1991). Therefore, risk sharing along 
the gas chain is settled by buyer bearing the volume risk and the seller the 
price risk. By means of such contracts strong basis for investment in highly 
asset-specific and capital-intensive infrastructure is established. (Joskow, 
1987; Newmann & Hirchhausen, 2004; Ruester, 2009) 
Coase (1937) underlines the role of long-term contracts - besides 
markets and vertically integrated firms - as one of the possible instruments of 
economic interaction in market economies. There are specific transaction 
costs that are inherent in each of those mechanisms: 




 Vertically integrated firms: depending on the firm size, the costs of a 
hierarchical organization and control; 
 Long-term contracts: the costs of their negotiation and enforcement. 
To sum up, high specificity of investment, shipping and storage costs 
has been among critical factors favoring the creation of marketplaces 
featuring the gas trade based on long-term contracts. (Newmann & 
Hirchhausen, 2004) 
2.2 Pricing mechanisms in gas industry 
Due to disparate nature of regional gas markets, presently there is no 
common world gas price. Eight different pricing systems were found to be 
available throughout the world in accordance to International Gas Union (IGU) 
Survey held in 2009: (Jensen, 2011) 
1. Gas-to-gas competition. Gas is priced in free-market on a spot basis 
or under long-term contracts. 
2. Oil price indexation. Prices are set by formula under long-term 
contracts, pegged to oil prices with some lag of usually several 
months. 
3. Bilateral monopoly. It has been the dominant pricing mechanism in 
interstate gas dealings of the Former Soviet Union, Central and 
Eastern Europe.  
4. Netback from final product. Price received by the gas seller reflects 
the price received by the buyer.  
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5. Regulation (cost of service). Prices are approved by a regulatory 
authority so as to cover supply costs including a reasonable return on 
investments. 
6. Regulation (social/political). Prices are set and adjusted typically on 
an ad hoc irregular basis by the government taking into account 
buyers’ perceived ability to pay, sellers’ perceived costs, and the 
government’s revenue needs.  
7. Regulation (below cost). The government knowingly sets prices 
below the sum of production and transportation costs as a form of 
subsidy to the buyers and usually reimburses the seller from the state 
budget. 
8. No price. The extreme form of regulation (below cost).  
The most common systems were gas-to-gas competition (33%) and 
regulation below cost (25%). This is largely because gas-to-gas competition 
operates in North American market and many governments use international 
pricing for exports, but subsidize their own consumers. (Jensen, 2011) 
Countries exporting natural gas on the basis of long-term contracts 
tend to focus on markets of countries favorable both in terms of volume and 
price. In order to prohibit gas re-sale while exporting to “less attractive 
markets” same netback price is offered and destination clauses are 
incorporated. Furthermore, exporters will tend to concentrate on the premium 
segments of the import country. In the case of exporting to non-premium 
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segments, these segments are isolated to avoid a deterioration of average 
export price. (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007, p.48) 
After the deregulation in the second half of the 1980s, North 
American gas presently has flexible market with freely traded pipeline 
capacities. Prices tend to be volatile; participants in the market make use of 
derivatives such as seventy-two month futures contracts offered by NYMEX 
to manage price risk in physical spot markets. The North American gas 
system has developed around a number of ‘hubs’ where pipeline 
interconnections bring gas flows together from various sources and re-
distribute it to different market regions. Henry hub serves as reference point in 
national gas trading and it has become the focus for the Henry Hub futures 
market trading on the NYMEX. When investment in new capacity is required, 
project sponsors will usually hold an ‘open season’ for potential shippers who 
are prepared to assume ‘ship-or-pay’ obligation so that the debt service on the 
investment is protected. (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007, p.119-120) 
UK’s transition from a government gas monopoly to liquid and 
competitive market today was a product of supply and demand conditions and 
major policy initiatives. On the supply side - reliance on low-cost gas from the 
Central North Sea domestic gas, discovered in 1965, and, on the demand side 
- the need to expand the UK’s power sector in an environmentally friendly 
way by using gas-fired power plants. Policy instruments in The Natural Gas 




 Privatization of monopoly - British Gas: The original British Gas has 
now devolved into three separate corporate activities: BG (acquired 
by Shell recently) – formerly the parent company, now is a major 
international gas company that is especially active in LNG, Centrica – 
the former marketing arm, now is a successful independent gas 
marketer and TransCo – the former transmission company that 
manages the gas transportation operations and has been acquired by 
the National Grid, which operates the transmission system that has 
five terminals (Bacton, Theddlethorp, Easington, Teesside and St. 
Fergus) where offshore pipelines connect to the grid. Once the gas 
passes the entry point it is considered to be on the NBP where it can 
be traded and taken out at any exit points. 
 Creation of a regulatory body, Ofgas (later Ofgem) to oversee 
competition: In 1989 Ofgas limited British Gas’s purchase of supply 
from new fields to 90%, required third-party access
3
 on it’s 
transportation system. (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007, p.126) 
Bacton (UK) - Zeebrugge (Belguim) Interconnector is used for 
forward flow for much of the year but backflow during the UK’s seasonal 
winter peaks allowing UK using storage on the Continent to manage its 
seasonality.  
                                                          
3 Note: Onshore, the third-party access works on the basis of entrance and exit charges for each 
of the receipt and delivery points on the grid plus a fee independent of location. The Article 18 
of the EU’s 2nd Gas Directive of 2003 prescribes third-party access to LNG terminals as a rule, 
however, exemptions for new infrastructure, including new LNG terminals may be granted 




To sum up, new gas imports to UK are an interesting mixture of some 
traditional long-term import contracts (some now linked to the gas spot price 
of International Petroleum Exchange, instead of fuel oil indicators), gas flows 
triggered by arbitrage with the Continent via the UK Interconnector and LNG 
supply subject to arbitrage with the other markets.  
Despite gas market reforms in EU since the end of the 1990s, long-
term import contracts has been persistent as the dominant import arrangement, 
now complemented by some imports, on a short-term basis from the UK and 
spot LNG. Adaptations to changed circumstances happened by modifying the 
original long-term contracts through changing the price formula to reflect the 
development in the competitive position of gas, mainly by increasing the 
share of gas oil, but also by including elements to reflect the changed role of 
gas in power generation and later the role of gas-to-gas competition, some 
modifications as to the size of volumes, term and more flexibility regarding 
the delivery point. 
2.3 Long-term take-or-pay export contracts 
In Continental Europe current long-term contracts date back to 1959, 
when Groningen field in the Netherlands was discovered. Nota de Pous 
presented to the Dutch parliament in 1962 by then Minister of Economic 
Affairs, established the main principles of the Dutch gas policy. In order to 
generate maximum revenue for the state, replacement value principle was 
introduced as the basis for gas marketing as opposed to prevailing cost plus 
principle. The price of gas was linked to the price of alternative fuels likely to 
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be substituted by the different types of consumers – for instance, gas oil for 
small-scale users and fuel oil for large-scale users. As a result the major 
elements incorporated in gas export contracts were the following: (Energy 
Charter Secretariat, 2007) 
 Long-term supply and offtake obligations ensured by the take-or-pay 
concept: the seller would commit a certain amount of gas reserves as 
well as gas delivery capacity and the buyer would commit a certain 
market volume; 
 Pricing based on the concept of netback value calculated on the basis 
of the value of competing energies backed to the border of the buyer’s 
country by deducting buyer’s transportation and distribution costs: 
Under this concept the base price of gas would be re-calculated at 
regular intervals (monthly or quarterly) in line with the absolute price 
movements of the competing fuels; 
 The possibility of price reviews at regular intervals (typically three 
years) in order to adapt to changed market circumstances: If the 
circumstances beyond the control of the Parties change significantly 
compared to the underlying assumptions in the prevailing price 
provisions each Party is entitled to an adjustment of the price 
provisions reflecting such changes;   







Pm =  Po + 0.60 x 0.80 x 0.0078 x (LFOm - LFOo)  + 0.40 x 0.90 x 
0.0076 x (HFOm - HFOo) 
(i) The gas price Pm: applicable during the month m is a function of the starting gas price 
Po and  
 the price development of competing fuels compared to the reference month, in this 
example: Light Fuel Oil (LFO) and Heavy Fuel Oil (HFO) 
(ii) 0.60 and 0.40 are shares of gas market segments competing with respective fuels (no 
dimension):  
 Light Fuel oil/Heavy Fuel Oil  
 These shares will be different from the shares of these fuels in total energy use; e.g., the 
share of heavy fuels used in most European markets is now rather small, however, it 
remains the best available alternative for most of the gas used for industrial purposes 
 0.80 and 0.90: Pass through factors (no dimension):  
o Sharing risk and reward of the price development between seller and buyer   
o Most of risk and reward for the seller (0.80/0.90)  
o May be different for different fuels 
(iii) 0.0078 and 0.0076: Technical equivalence factors to convert the units of prices for fuel 
into units of gas price  
In this example:  
Gas in kWh (GCV), Fuel oil in t,  
Dimension: Euro cts / kWh / Euro / t 
(iv) Competing Fuels  
Quotations reflecting the market  
With or without taxes on competing fuels  
Time lag and Reference Period to be defined  
LFO: Price of Light Fuel oil  
LFOo: Price of Light Fuel Oil for starting month o  
LFOm: Price of Light Fuel Oil resulting for month m (may refer to an average value of 
previous months depending on reference period and time lag agreed)  
LFO is usually reflecting competition for medium and smaller customers whose alternative is 
using Light Fuel Oil (typically small industry, commercial, administration, households). 
Serving those customers requires also investment into distribution (grid) to medium and small 
customers, and eventually more instruments to provide the flexibility needed. That would have 
to be taken into account in the determination of Po.  
HFO: Price of Heavy fuel oil  
HFOo: Price of Heavy Fuel Oil for starting month o  
HFOm: Price of Heavy Fuel Oil for month m  
Reflecting competition for larger customers whose alternative is using Heavy Fuel Oil 
(typically in boilers) 
(v) Determination/negotiation of Po (starting price in month 0) reflecting the netback to 
the point of delivery:  
Use of Currency (of the sales market)  
Po determined (negotiated) as:  
Replacement value minus costs to bring the gas from the delivery point to the customers minus 
marketing incentives. 




The concept of replacement value results in different netback values 
at the exporting country’s border for different customers due to variation in 
                                                          
4 Source: Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007, p.154. 
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transportation costs. For instance in pipeline gas trade export prices at 
delivery point X for supplies to markets Y and Z are calculated as a price at 
consumer market less transportation cost from delivery point X. Thus, on the 
netback basis the longer the distance from the delivery point to the particular 
market, the lower the price of gas at this point for the supplies to this specific 
market. Theoretically this creates opportunities for arbitrage by the buyer. 
Consequently, “destination clauses” prohibit reselling of the gas destined for a 
market which is more distant from the delivery point at a cheaper price at the 
closest to the delivery point market to protect exporter position. (Konoplyanik, 
2005) 
The organisation of Russian gas exports to Europe has been based on 
Groningen concept with some specificities such as minimum-pay obligation 
with a high annual load factor in order to ensure a high utilization rate of 
pipeline system. Since 2005, Gazprom takes the price in the main EU markets 
at the end of the pipeline (Germany, France and Italy), as a reference point, 
and then deducts the difference in transportation costs. (Energy Charter 
Secretariat, 2007, p.167) 








Ending date Annual 
Volume in 
Bcm 
OMV (Austria) Gazexport 
(Russia) 





                                                          
5 Based on the data from Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007, p.158. 
18 
 
ENI (Italy) Gazprom 
(Russia) 
2006 2035 (an 
extension from 
previous 






- 2036 (an 
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previous 
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The main elements of the Norwegian long-term export contract from 
Troll field included: (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007, p.160) 
 A price review clause;  
 A price was in local currency, with 50-60% indexation to light fuel oil, 
the rest to heavy fuel oil and a special element to reflect competition 
with electricity in French case;  
 National border of the buyer was defined as a delivery point;  
 An option to increase original volumes (by 80% or more) was granted 
to buyers, conditional on an obligation to use it in covering at least a 
part of incremental demand.  
 An annual take-or-pay obligation.  
First Algerian LNG deals with the UK and the US were fixed-price 
deals, and then in mid-1970s Sonatrach concluded LNG contracts with Spain, 
France and Belgium on a netback basis with an indexation to fuel oils. 
Presently, Algeria has – unlike the other large exporters to the EU – a 
substantial part of its price formulas pegged to crude oil instead of to fuel oils. 
(Energy Charter Secretariat, p.161) 
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2.4 Long-term contracts in traditional LNG trade 
Long-term contracts concluded for the duration of more than 20 years 
have been serving as traditional contracting pattern in the LNG industry as 
each element in its value chain is capital-intensive and the investment is 
usually front-end loaded so that revenue does not begin to flow until the 
project is complete. FOB or DES was used as delivery terms, determining 
which party assumes the tanker transportation responsibility. Traditionally 
tankers were dedicated to the specific project during its lifetime and could be 
owned by buyer, seller or independent ship-owners. Furthermore, LNG long-
term Sale and Purchase Agreements overseeing the logic of ‘the buyer takes 
the volume risk and the seller takes the price risk’ had take-or-pay provisions 
and indexation was principally defined in oil terms. Chilled gas projects have 
been tied to a specific large field or group of fields and unless the project is 
developed solely by a national oil company, project developers have usually 
been joint ventures of several companies. Since traditional LNG contract 
buyers were usually national companies or regulated utilities with exclusive 
concessions, such as Gaz de France or Tokyo Electric, they could reasonably 
foresee and manage market development and thereby handle the market risk 
implied by the take-or-pay and minimum pricing clauses. Nevertheless, 
contracting in LNG is becoming much more flexible with introduction of 
small, but growing short-term market, and development of ‘self-contracting’. 
In a ‘short-term’ market buyers swap cargoes from time to time as one 
customer found himself temporarily long on supply while another was 
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temporarily short. Still, long-term contracts have remained as the principal 
means of sharing risks among venture partners. This is partly due to the 
supplier’s reluctance to proceed with a new project without some degree of 
long-term contract protection despite substantial pressure to increase 
flexibility in LNG contracting. On the other hand, buyers are now commonly 
smaller and much more sensitive to price competition. By seeking to 
minimize their market risks by relying on gas market indicators, they have 
effectively transferred more of the project risks to the sellers. The response of 
the sellers has increasingly been towards ‘self-contracting’ with their own 
marketing affiliates, effectively integrating downstream to sell directly to 
smaller re-sellers or end users. For instance, in traditional contracting, the 
venture partners usually market as a group directly to specific customers and 
the contract designates the destination of the cargoes. In self-contracting, one 
or more of the partners in the venture (or their marketing affiliates) sign the 
SPA with the venture and assume the marketing risk for the contracted 
volumes. The resulting volumes commonly become part of the seller’s supply 
portfolio and can be sold under any terms and conditions that he chooses to 
utilize. Self-contracting is becoming the predominant pattern in liberalized 
markets of North America and UK where gas-to-gas competition prevails. 
Cargoes being shifted between Nigeria and Trinidad on the one hand and the 
US and Spain on the other, the Atlantic Basin has become the major LNG 
arbitrage market. Some mechanism to share those rents is commonly included 
in the agreement, in case if arbitrage presents the possibility of added rents. 
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(Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007; Crocker & Masten, 1991; Jensen, 2004; 
Neumann and Hirschhausen, 2004; Ruester, 2009; Talus, 2011) 
Northeast Asia, Continental Europe, North America, the UK, China 
and India are currently six significant regional markets importing LNG. Gas 
pricing in Northeast Asia and Continental Europe is a product of the price 
negotiations that buyers have had over the years with their suppliers. North 
America and the UK have liberalized their gas industries, and their gas pricing 
has reflected competition among indigenous suppliers for outlet. China and 
India have a history of local gas pricing that has been heavily influenced by 
regulation. Japanese, Korean and Taiwanese contracts use Japanese Customs 
Clearing price for crude oil indexation. In this context, the first new Middle 
East contracts to Korea and Japan retained the JCC pricing formulas and 
competition centered on price capping mechanisms. For instance, the first 
Korean contract from Rasgas 1 project (Qatar) had included a floor price; 
however, after Oman offered Kogas a contract without a floor price, Rasgas 
removed the floor price from the first contract as a part of negotiations for 
expanded deliveries. Moreover, the late 1990s saw the shortening of contract 
terms (i.e. from 20 to 15 years or less) and some additional off-take flexibility. 
Furthermore, there were a number of innovative contracts, such as ones 
signed by Petronas (Malaysia) provided for three tranches of contract 
commitment. The base load portion of the contract with a group of Japanese 
buyers operated as a traditional 20-year take-or-pay contract, the second 
tranche was annual having the same terms as the base load except fixed take 
obligation and last tranche was simply supply option. Rasgas has a long-term 
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contract with the Daheej terminal in India where they have established a fixed 
price ($2.53/MMBtu FOB Qatar) to operate for a period of five years before 
the oil escalation clause kicks in. After the fixed price period expires, the 
contract is supposedly pegged to $20/bbl oil, with a 0.13 ‘A’ coefficient in a 
P=A*Oil Price formula. Regarding contracts with Pacific Basin countries, in 
the most of Algerian SPAs for European buyers some form of oil-indexation 
remains as the dominant pattern. At the same time the seller was willing to 
offer indexation terms of a mix of crude oil and products, partial indexation to 
electricity, coal or to inflation. Nigerian export contracts pricing clauses for 
the most part reflect competition with pipeline supply in their markets and 
utilize some mix of fuel oil and gas oil pricing. The exception is the contract 
with power generator ENEL where price clause is believed to include coal and 
inflation in addition to oil prices. Starting in 2001, Qatar began contracting 
with customers in Spain and Italy, presumably utilizing competitive escalation 
clauses and in the US and the UK primarily contracting with venture partners 
who will market the LNG on behalf of the venture. (Energy Charter 
Secretariat, 2007)  
2.5 Conclusion 
For those markets that have been developed largely on the basis of 
imported supply, such as the European Continent and Northeast Asia, long-
term contracts have been extremely important and are likely to remain so. 
Pricing clauses in these contracts have commonly been tied to either crude oil 
or products prices and many contracts allow for a regular review of the 
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pricing formula. However, for markets that have historically been largely self-
sufficient and have restructured their gas industries, such as North America 
and the UK, short-term contracting prevails and oil-linked pricing is a rarity. 
At the same time significant volumes of LNG have been contracted 
by aggregators, some of them selling gas to different companies under long-
term contracts based on their global portfolio, others may retain some LNG 
volumes to feed the markets where they operate and arbitrage between the 
different import regions. For instance in the event of cold weather and 
resulting supply shortage in one region aggregators would benefit from higher 
margins, but during the periods of low demand and a comfortable supply 
resulting in low spot prices their margins will be eroded. 
Destination clauses are of the most important features of the long-
term contracts. They do not allow re-export of the cargoes by the importer to 
benefit from arbitraging opportunities. Such clauses have been gradually 
eliminated from supply contracts to Europe.  
Hartley (2014) outlines the factors that have affected the evolution 
and increased importance of spot trade in LNG markets:  
 Long-term LNG contracts have become more flexible with addition of 
destination flexibility, allowing quantity adjustments, wider range of 
pricing options (Weems, 2006); 
 Availability of cargo reloading facilities in some of the LNG receiving 
terminals that enabled re-export of cargoes from buyer’s LNG storage 
tanks;  
 Use of swap agreements;  
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 An increase in the number of “branded” LNG cargoes6; 
 Final investment decisions for some of the recent LNG projects have 
been made without 100% offtake commitments by buyers creating 
uncommitted volumes available for spot market trade. 
 Many of the suppliers whose early long-term contracts expired retain 
spare capacity therefore have entered the short-term markets. (Thompson, 
2009) 
The analysis in Hartley (2014) suggests that potential US LNG export 
projects featured on a tolling basis
7
 should further stimulate the trends toward 
more spot and short-term trading and greater flexibility in long-term LNG 
contracts. Furthermore, numerous buyers contract for supply that will go into 
global portfolios (“branded LNG”) without dedication to any particular 
customer. Another point is that modular liquefaction units with lower capital 
costs and capacity utilizing existing infrastructure (port and pipeline facilities), 
further reducing up-front capital costs. To sum up, lower investment costs in 
turn might reduce the need for long-term contracts to stabilize cash flows and 
underwrite debt financing. Furthermore, the reduced up-front capital costs and 
further development of “branded LNG” should also reduce the benefits of 
vertical integration between LNG liquefaction capacity and LNG marketing. 
 
                                                          
6 Note: sellers of LNG source their supply from multiple locations instead of entering into 
contracts that tie imports by one customer to a small number of liquefaction plants. 
7 Note: Tolling contract: whereby the customers purchase the gas and then pay the liquefaction 
plant operator a fee to liquefy the gas and load it onto ships for export. 
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Chapter 3 An empirical assessment of the long-
term gas contracts evolution in the changing 




Long-term contracts (LTC) have been used as a tool for sharing market risks 
related to asset-specific and capital-intensive investments through formation 
of bilateral dependency between the seller and the buyer for a considerable 
period of time (Crocker and Masten, 1991). Nevertheless, prior research 
indicates that gas market deregulation processes in the North America, UK 
and Continental Europe have led to shorter gas sale and purchase deals. 
(Neumann and Von Hirschhausen, 2004)  
The purpose of this chapter is an empirical analysis of the effect of 
numerous developments happening around global natural gas markets such as 
market liberalization, global economic recession, technological change, 
flexibility in contractual provisions and increase in LNG tanker fleet capacity 
to the duration of long-term contracts. The outcomes of the empirical studies 
may offer some insights in terms of planning for future cash flows stability, 
provision of the security of demand for produced gas, minimizing transaction 
costs and foreseeing proper distribution of market risks during planning for 
new asset and relationship specific investments. (Niyazmuradov & Heo, 
2017a,b)  
                                                          
8 Note: Some passages in this chapter have been quoted verbatim from the following source: 
Niyazmuradov S & Heo E. (2017): Long-term natural gas contracts evolution in the changing 
industry environment, Geosystem Engineering, DOI:10.1080/12269328.2017.1341348. 
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This chapter is structured as follows:  
Section 3.2 provides literature review. Section 3.3 analyzes changing 
industry environment. Section 3.4 describes the data and methodology. 
Section 3.5 explains empirical results. Finally, last section provides 
conclusions.   
3.2 Literature review 
The trigger of the research on the nature of the long-term contracts 
dates back to the second half of the 1980s (e.g. Joskow, 1987) when gas 
market was restructured in North America and followed by the United 
Kingdom. The subject was brought on the limelight again in 2000s mainly 
due to gas supply security concerns as possible outcome of the gas and 
electricity market liberalization trends in Continental Europe.  
Careful literature review reveals the existence of three main streams 
on long-term contracts research: (Niyazmuradov & Heo, 2017a,b; Neumann 
et al., 2015) 
 The institutional economics literature sees long-term contracts 
as a tool to avoid the risks of opportunistic behavior in deals 
involving high sunk investments, as in the seminal papers by 
Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978) and Williamson (1983). 
Furthermore, it deals with the repercussions between the 
contract length and the institutional framework. Joskow (1987, 
1988a) shows that the duration of contracts in the American 
coal industry is positively related to the level of asset-
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specificity. In the natural gas industry, Crocker and Masten 
(1985) and Masten and Crocker (1988) observe shorter contract 
lengths in an inefficiently regulated commodity market in 
comparison with competitive market. Mulherin (1986) provides 
evidence that governmental regulation in the US (mainly the 
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 and the Natural 
Gas Act of 1936) led to an increasing use of long-term 
contracts and take-or-pay provisions and price adjustments 
reducing the hold-up problem. Hubbard and Weiner (1986) 
analyze take-or-pay provisions of long-term gas supply 
contracts following deregulation of wellhead prices in the US. 
The sample of 884 natural gas contracts, collected by the 
Energy Information Administration in 1982, signed after the 
1978 Natural Gas Policy Act reveals minor effects in mean 
take-or-pay requirements, in line with MacAvoy’s (1962) 
observations. Doane and Spulber (1994) argue that open access 
to the transportation system reduces the potential for bilateral 
monopoly between pipeline owners and field producers and the 
related contractual holdup problem. Neumann and 
Hirschhausen (2004) utilizing the dataset of long-term contracts 
concluded by European importers since 1985 show that the 
length of take-or-pay contracts for gas supply to Europe has 
significantly decreased over the past two decades, which 
supposedly is driven largely by the move towards liberalization. 
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The results do not suggest the disappearance of long-term 
contracts for European gas supply; rather, they put emphasis on 
required structural changes of these contracts adapting to a 
more competitive environment. In a theoretical paper, Neuhoff 
and Hirschhausen (2005) take the analysis a step further by 
accounting for different short-run and long-run demand 
elasticities. The analysis shows that if long-run demand 
elasticity is significantly higher than short-run elasticity, 
producers prefer institutional arrangements allowing for long-
term contracting. 
 The industrial organization literature analyzes the role of long-
term contracts in comparison to short-term trading. Using an 
auction model, Parsons (1989b) shows that an increase in the 
the number of wholesale buyers decreases the value of 
contracts to the producer. Brito & Hartley (2002) applying  
search model found that the length of LNG trade deals is likely 
to diminish in the near future, as investment and transport costs 
fall and the number of players in the global gas markets 
increase; their model suggests that the market structure will 
change from bilateral trade using long-term contracts towards 
multilateral trade using other types of contracts (spot, short-run). 
The theoretical industrial organization literature mainly 
addresses the issue in its relation to market structure, i.e. 
whether long-term contracting favors competition or collusion. 
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Moving to collusive behaviour, Le Coq (2004) shows that 
current gas market setting where long-term contracts co-exist 
with spot markets helps in sustaining collusive behaviour in 
short-term markets. 
 A third strand of the literature links long-term contracts with 
infrastructure investments. Proponents of liberalization 
regularly argue that a market based mainly on shorter-term 
contractual arrangements is compatible with long-term supply 
security as long as alternative trading arrangements, e.g. 
through spot markets, can be established. It has been widely 
recognized that long-term contracts serve as a means of 
minimizing transaction costs for two parties engaging in a 
commitment involving significant specific assets. Long-term 
contracts including requirement clauses, price indexation, 
liquidated damages, arbitration and other provisions have been 
identified as a means to overcome the “hold-up” problem 
without vertical integration. The hold-up problem is likely to 
arise when transaction-specific investments are required. (Klein 
et. al., 1978) Indeed, asset-specific investments and uncertainty 
are the main contributing factors to a high level of transaction 
costs as defined by Williamson (1975, 1985), all of which 
explain requirements of alternative institutional arrangements 
as opposed to “simple” contracting (Williamson, 1983). As a 
theoretical response to transaction cost economics, the concept 
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of incomplete contracts has been developed (Grossmann & 
Hart, 1986; Hart & Moore, 1988). Both concepts are based on 
the assumption of opportunistic behavior by the agents whose 
rationality is bounded. However, as pointed out by Saussier 
(2000), the main difference of these concepts is the role of 
contracts: whereas in the incomplete contracting framework 
contracts minimize ex ante investments distortions, in the 
setting of transaction cost economics they provide sufficient 
investment incentives and inexpensive ex-post renegotiation. 
The research since Coase’s (1937) article has brought forward many 
amendments to institutional economics, but all contributors so far agree upon 
the fact that minimizing transaction costs depends on the degree of asset-
specificity, on the level of uncertainty, and the frequency of transactions. 
Moreover, studies on transaction cost economics - which  is a comparative 
analysis studying governance structures under the target of economizing 
exchange relationships with respect to the sum of both production and 
transaction costs - intensified in the mid-1980s. Williamson (1975, 1985, 
1993) operationalized transaction cost economics by defining a transaction as 
“occur[ing] when a good or service is traded across a technologically 
separable interface” discussing the determinants of (ex-post) transaction costs 
and contractual difficulties. In this context, economic actors are assumed to be 
characterized by bounded rationality and may behave opportunistically guided 
by considerations of self-interest (Williamson, 1985, p. 47). Ex-post bilateral 
dependencies encourage ex-post hold-up by the non-investing party and 
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provide economic incentives to internalize quasi-rents
9
 into the own hierarchy. 
Two types of opportunistic behavior are distinguished: i) deviations from 
joint-surplus maximizing within the terms of an existing agreement and ii) 
enforcement of renegotiations and modification of contractual terms in the 
case unexpected changes in market conditions evolve (hold-up). At the same 
time in neoclassical economics contracts are assumed to be complete 
considering all possible future developments ex-ante in the contracting stage. 
Consequently, asset specificity without uncertainty allows for the conclusion 
of complete contingent claim contracts whereas uncertainty without asset 
specificity can be dealt with in exchanges on competitive markets. Finally, in 
the eyes of incentive theory the firm is understood as “nexus of a set of 
contracting relationships“ (Klein, 1999, p. 466) with the central question 
being the optimal design of ex-ante incentive compatible contracts suited to 
mitigate agency costs in the face of potential adverse selection and moral 
hazard.  
3.3 Theoretical background 
We approach the issue of long-term contracts from institutional 
economics, transaction economics and energy security perspectives. 
The institutional economics views long-term contracts as an 
organizational form situated somewhere between vertical integration and free 
markets. (Coarse, 1937; Ruester, 2009; Niyazmuradov & Heo, 2017a,b) It is 
true that in 2000s along with the increase in the dynamics of LNG markets 
                                                          
9 The excess value of an asset over its salvage value is termed ‘quasi-rent’. 
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thanks to the new discoveries of natural gas and tapping into unconventional 
resources spot and short-term markets started to gain higher importance. The 
start of liberalization processes led to the emergence of gas hubs such as 
Henry Hub or NBP. However, a bulk of other hubs still remains relatively 
illiquid and most of the regions of the world still don’t have one. As a result 
most of the producers, especially those from landlocked regions still need to 
be bound with the long-term contracts in the gas trade. Therefore, the fate of 
the long-term contracts, their evolution in accordance with the changing 
industry and global economic environment has been closely tracked by them.     
Another important point from the lens of gas producers is the demand 
security for gas produced. Usually most of the gas exporting countries are 
dependent on the revenues from gas exports and use them for the domestic 
development purposes such as investment in infrastructure, capacity building 
and education. Therefore, the provision of gas demand security is of foremost 
importance for gas exporting countries in terms of long-term revenue flow 
and subsequent investment planning.  
While demand security
10
 concerns date back to 1980s when European 
consumers significantly reduced energy consumption as a result of the two oil 
crises of the 1970s. However, those concerns were limited to oil until late 
1990s when gas market liberalization trends have led to inclusion of natural 
gas into the agenda of discussions on demand security. Producers’ worries 
were related to unbundling in importing countries which undermined their 
                                                          
10  Note: Demand security was defined by then Saudi Minister for Petroleum and Mineral 
Resources as ‘continued access into the markets of oil importing  countries, the steady share of 
oil in total energy consumption over the long term, and  fair and stable prices that allow for 
their sustainable development over the lifetime of  the resource’ (Fattouh and van der Linde 
2011, p. 61). 
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ownership of some pipelines beyond their territory. On the other hand, gas 
demand security debates remained fairly tacit until the turn of the millennium 
because initial liberalization meant only information transparency. 
Nevertheless, in the turn of the new millennium demand security debates 
‘were given more content’ because they included ‘issues of policy uncertainty, 
data transparency, human capital shortages, the IOC-NOC relationship and 
the role of technology’ (Fattouh and van der Linde 2011, p. 116). For instance, 
producers have argued that revenues from the sale of hydrocarbons are crucial 
for their development, for social inclusion and stable employment. Therefore, 
it led to the most tangible development in the concept of demand security due 
to deepening liberalization in the form of legal and ownership separation of 
upstream, midstream and downstream businesses and drastic decrease in the 
costs of chilled gas. It  implied that gas suppliers may be progressively 
stripped of the guaranteed consumption that underlined the very development 
of the industry and may lead to redundancy of costly pipeline infrastructure 
and convergence between previously disparate regional gas markets. 
(Romanova, 2013)  
Table 3.1 Instruments suppliers use for the enhancement of the security of demand 
 Economic Political 
1 Storage facilities An attempt to use international 
legislation to limit the freedom of 
consumers to change their internal 
legislation 
2 Long-term contracts  Cooperation among producers 
3 Control of transportation routes Dialogue between consumers and 
producers 
4 Regular trials to offset or correct the 
changes in regulation of consuming 
countries 
Investment in the improvement of stable 
supplier reputation 
5 Strategy of diversification  
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a) Diversification of export markets  
b) Diversification of energy 
production 
 
c) Export of value added, processed 
final goods 
 
d) Diversification away from 
energy goods 
 
When we talk about the means that producers use to further demand 
security they can be structured in two groups: economic and political: 
(Romanova, 2013) 
i) Economic Means: At least five economic leverages are used by 
suppliers to defend their interests:  
 Storage facilities for natural gas and spare capacities: These 
instruments are helpful to offset short term (daily and seasonal) 
fluctuations in demand, sharp hikes and falls in prices and so on.  
 Long-term contracts: The attractiveness of long-term contracts lies in 
the fact that they guarantee certain consumption for a period of about 
20 + years. If an importing country does not need that amount of gas, 
it still has to pay for it (take-or-pay obligation). As a result long-term 
contracts guarantee a predictable cash-flow (revenues and credits), 
which is essential to make costly investments in upstream business 
and transportation.  
 Control of transportation routes: For example, denial of third-party 
access to its gas pipelines (both in bilateral negotiations and in the 
talks on the Energy Charter Treaty and on its accession to the WTO) 
has been allowing Russia to regulate Central Asian resources access 
to European market.  
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 Producers’ attempts to offset or correct disadvantageous changes in 
the regulation of consuming countries: Examples include: defending 
interests of relevant national companies in the new legal environment, 
bidding for distribution networks, inviting energy companies of 
importing countries to participate in the development of new gas 
fields on their territory in exchange for their share in the distribution 
market. 
 The strategy of diversification: Producers actively apply the strategy 
of diversification to hedge their stakes and to balance the desire of 
consumers to decrease their dependence on oil and natural gas.  
 Geographical diversification of export markets: The idea is to 
return to the situation when consumers compete for resources 
as opposed to the competition among exporters.  
 Diversification of energy production: Fashionable trend is the 
oil and gas producers’ interest in renewable sources of energy.   
 Export of value-added, processed final goods: It is a move 
away from the export of raw energy materials to oil- and gas-
processing on the national territory and to the export of the 
production of refineries and gas factories.  
 Diversification away from energy goods: It manifests itself at 
the national and corporate level. This approach allows them 
to remove superior oil and gas revenues (and therefore fight 
inflation), cushion external shocks (like 2008 financial crises) 
with the help of this money, set aside, and use them to finance 
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modernization of the country (Austvik, 2009). Similarly big 
oil and gas companies moved to other (energy-intensive) 
sectors (like metal or chemical production) to secure the 
demand and at the same time gain profit from alternative 
sources.  
ii) Political Means: They mostly perform an auxiliary function and five 
types of exporters activities are differentiated in this regard:  
 An attempt to use international legislation to limit the freedom of 
consumers to change their internal legislation.  
 Cooperation among producers: OPEC and GECF are the examples of 
forums where oil and gas exporting countries meet.  
 Dialogue between producers and consumers: There are both global 
initiatives (like the International Energy Forum (IEF)) and regional 
ones (i.e. between the EU and its suppliers like Norway, Russia and 
the Gulf Countries).  
 Investment in the improvement of stable supplier reputation: 
Producing countries have used various measures to calm their 
partners such as speeches of political leaders and business 
representatives, increased transparency, hiring western PR agencies to 
present their strategies and so on.  
“Transaction cost economics predicts that investments in idiosyncratic 
assets result in ex-post bilateral dependency and lead to a lock-in situation 
where the investor faces the hazard of post-contractual opportunism and 
strategic bargaining by the counterparty. In such settings longer-term 
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agreements attenuate those costs by stipulating the terms of trade over the life 
of the contract.” (Ruester, 2009, p.141) 
One distinguishes ex-ante costs (e.g., discovering potential trading 
partners and relevant prices, negotiating and writing contracts) from ex-post 
costs (e.g., costs from maladaptation, renegotiation, monitoring, and breach of 
contract). The focus of transaction cost economics typically is on ex-post 
transaction costs which become especially relevant under long-term 
contracting and might exceed ex-ante costs by far. (Ruester, 2009) However, 
our approach is based on both ex-ante and ex-post costs. We argue that as 
soon as the contract duration ends there is a likelihood of emergence of ex-
ante costs related to finding new trade partner(s), negotiating and writing 
contracts in case if importer from the expired contract decides not to prolong 
the relationship. Even in the case when the previous partner decides to 
prolong the gas import contract it is highly likely he will be insisting on 
reflection of the market changes (that may be disadvantageous to the exporter) 
in the renewed contract or on an amendment to the old one. Summarizing, it is 
essential to “[o]rganize transactions so as to economize on bounded rationality 
while simultaneously safeguarding them against the hazards of 
opportunism”
11
 due to the fact that parties to the contract are motivationally 
more complex due to opportunism in the sense of self-interest and cognitively 
less competent due to bounded rationality from the transaction cost economics 
perspective. (Ruester, 2009)  
                                                          
11 Williamson, O. E. (1986). The Economics of Governance: Framework and Implications. In: 
Economics as a Process – Essays in the New Institutional Economics, Langlois, Richard N.  
(eds.), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, p.177 
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To sum up we approach the long-term contracts as an organizational 
form situated between vertical integration and free market. Furthermore, we 
accept that longer contract duration tend to lessen transaction costs related to 
renegotiation sort of opportunistic behavior of non-investing party, which is 
usually the buyer or ex-ante costs regarding the discovery of the new potential 
gas trade partner. Lastly in terms of security of demand we see long-term gas 
export contracts as a tool to ensure gas demand stability and subsequently 
stable revenue flow to gas exporting countries for the period when the 
contract is in force.    
3.4 Changing natural gas industry environment and long-
term contracts 
The empirical evidence from the US and the UK gas market 
liberalization experience suggests that while long-term contracts haven’t 
entirely disappeared their length shortened significantly (to approximately 8-
15 years instead of 20-25 years) leading to the market share loss by wholesale 
buyers. Furthermore, in both markets, oil price indexation has been partially 
or totally replaced by gas spot-price indexation. In the first few years after 
market liberalization, gas prices indeed had fallen to the level of long-run 
marginal costs and this situation prevailed for about a decade (Neuhoff and 
Hirschhausen, 2004). The share of gas supplies through long-term contracts 
went down from about 100% to below 50%. Until 1991, the average contract 
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volume fell from 1.27 bcm/a to 0.24 bcm/a.
12
 Nevertheless, EU long-term 
import contracts have been able to keep their dominance, complemented by 
some spot market supplies. At the same time they went through some 
adaptation process to new market realities for instance by inclusion of 
flexibility elements to the size of volumes, term and delivery point etc. 
(Niyazmuradov & Heo, 2017b) 
Gas plays an increasing role in the EU energy mix. It was identified 
as a strategic resource in the EU Green Paper on Energy Supply Security  
mainly because of its increased use in power generation, low carbon content 
and environmental advantages. (EU, 2001) At the same time it is clear there 
will be a need for imports as indigenous supply from UK, the Netherlands and 
Norway will not be able to meet anticipated increase in demand due to 
technical and economic hurdles. Gas production in the The North Sea is on 
decline and the Netherlands will continue to play the role of swing supplier. 
Despite huge efforts by North African suppliers (Algeria, Libya and Egypt) 
they have yet to conquer a market share in European supply that corresponds 
to their low-cost reserves. Finally, Russia is eager to expand its market share 
from current 40% of EU imports to two-thirds. (Neumann & Hirschhausen, 
2004, pp.176-77)  
Regarding the discussion on whether long-term contracts are 
compatible with gas market liberalization, industry’s argument was that third 
party access to transmission and downstream infrastructure will lead to price 
                                                          
12 Neumann, A. & von Hirschhausen, C. (2004). Less long-term gas to Europe? A Quantitative 
Analysis of European Long-Term Gas Supply Contracts,  Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft, Vol. 
28 (3), p. 177. 
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and demand volatility undermining long-term supply security (Wybrew, 2002, 
Czernie, 2002) On the other hand, proponents of deregulation suggested that 
new forms of contracts, based on spot or over-the counter markets, are rapidly 
gaining popularity in liberalized gas markets, such as the US or the UK, and 
that Europe is likely to follow suit. In this context, if we glance at the Gas 
Directive 2003/55/EC on the one hand called for “stringent market opening 
until July 2007 (Art. 23), unbundling of transmission (Art. 9) and distribution 
system operators (Art. 13), and transparent, non-discriminatory third-party 
access (TPA) to pipelines and storage facilities (Art. 18, 19). But on the other 
hand, it also acknowledges the need to maintain take-or-pay contracts 
(Number 25 of the preamble) and to allow pipeline owners to refuse TPA in 
case of real or expected financial difficulties (Art. 21). Major new 
infrastructure such as interconnectors, LNG terminals, and storage facilities 
may be exempted from the TPA obligation: Member States can apply for 




Hypothesis 1: Transition from a monopoly industry to competitive market 
structures shortens length of long-term contracts. 
The decline in economic activity has a negative impact on the oil and 
gas sector as it leads to a steep decline in oil and gas prices resulting in falling 
revenues for oil and gas companies and tight credit conditions. For instance in 
early 2009, oil prices fell to 33 USD from a 147 USD in July 2008 and gas 
prices over the same period went down from USD14 to USD4. Decline in 
                                                          
13 Neumann, A. & von Hirschhausen, C. (2004). Less long-term gas to Europe? A Quantitative 
Analysis of European Long-Term Gas Supply Contracts, Zeitschrift für Energiewirtschaft, Vol. 
28 (3), p. 177. 
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demand due to deceleration in activity was the major factor.
14
 On October 21, 
2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago released the data showing that the 
three-month moving average of this CFNAI index
15
 had fallen below - 0.70, 
which was a typical indication of a recession. A recession could affect the 
amount of natural gas consumed by the power generation sector. As demand 
for electricity in other sectors plunges generation segment most likely to see 
the immediate effects of a demand reduction. In many countries natural gas 
tends to be the marginal generation source. Natural gas prices tend to follow 
crude oil price trends however, the relationship can be disrupted by more local 
events, such as weather conditions and heating demand. In a recession 
scenario with reduced demand, putting more natural gas into the market 
would likely further suppress prices.
16
 Then, oil prices recovered to levels 
above USD100/bbl. (Brent) by early 2011 and remained (on a monthly 
average basis) around that level until September 2014. In Asia by mid-2014 
LNG spot prices were in free-fall. Initially this was attributed to a mild 2013-
2014 winter in some Asian importing countries but a growing concern 
appeared to be the reduced pace of Asian LNG demand growth.
17
 
Killian (2009) using the data for the period of 1970-2007 
decomposed oil prices into three components: oil supply shocks; global 
demand shocks; and oil-specific demand shocks which reflect “precautionary 
                                                          
14 www.investopedia.com. 
15 Note: Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI): is a monthly index to gauge overall 
economic activity and related inflationary pressure. CFNAI measures the change in activity 
across 85 economic indicators in the United States. 
16 Gulick, C. (2008). Natural gas prices in a recession, Natural gas and Electricity, Wiley 
Periodicals, Inc., December 2008, pp.13-18. 
17 Rogers, H.V. (2015). The Impact of Lower Gas and Oil Prices on Global Gas and LNG 




demand” associated with market concerns about the availability of future oil 
supplies. He found that oil price shocks historically have been driven mainly 
by a combination of global aggregate demand shocks and precautionary 
demand shocks rather than oil supply shocks as it is commonly believed. On 
the other hand the evidence suggests that the impact of oil prices on activity 
and vice versa has significantly declined since the mid-1980s as a result of the 
falling oil-intensity of GDP. A sharp decline in oil prices was associated 
mostly with weakening demand as a result of the 1997 Asian crisis. A severe 
contraction in global demand sent all commodity prices tumbling during the 




Figure 3.1 Energy prices.
19
 
Therefore, due to the decline in overall economic activity, importers 
and exporters may want to conclude shorter-term gas sale and purchase 
contracts as buyers are not clear about the volumes of gas they will need in 
the mid- and long-term and sellers are not satisfied with prevailing low natural 
                                                          
18 Baffes et al. (2015). The Great Plunge in Oil Prices: Causes, Consequences, and Policy 
Responses, World Bank Group Policy Research Note, PRN/15/01, pp.1-60. 
19 Source: Baffles et al. (2015 ). The Great Plunge in Oil Prices: Causes, Consequences, and 
Policy Responses, World Bank Group Policy Research Note, PRN/15/01, p.37. 
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gas and oil prices. Generally, the prices for oil might be of more relevance as 
the bulk of the long-term contracts retain oil-indexed formulas along with 
base price. 
Hypothesis 2: Global economic recession has affected the duration of the 
long-term contracts negatively. 
Availability of flexible LNG cargoes 
Pipeline gas has more rigid infrastructure link that locks the exporter to a 
particular region, therefore vulnerable to structural changes in end-use 
markets, upstream risks or transit developments. In contrast, LNG is also 
vulnerable to upstream issues, but its ability to react more swiftly to changes 
on the end-user market is increasingly appreciated. Transit issues have not 
affected LNG so far, despite the existence of some choke points. Another 
important advantage of the LNG’s business model is the flexibility of how it 
is transported to the buyer. The delivery modalities defined in long-term 
contracts are either free on board (FOB) or delivered ex-ship (DES): 
 With FOB deliveries, the transfer of risks and ownership from 
seller to buyer occurs when cargo passes the ship’s rail at the 
port of shipment. This allows the buyer greater flexibility with 
regard to destination; however, the buyer must pay for 
shipping, insurance, regasification capacity and other costs. 
 Delivery ex-ship (DES) usually provides less room for 
reselling, as the seller is supposed to liquefy and deliver the 
cargo to the import terminal. DES contracts with a destination 
clause therefore limit the flexibility to resell or redirect LNG. 
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In order to be able to redirect a cargo, the buyer must engage 
in negotiation with the seller or has to own reloading facilities. 
Initially, LNG seemed to be a product relatively similar to pipeline 
gas as trade relationships were point-to-point and bilateral. However, in the 
late 1990s, driven by deregulation in some of key markets (US and UK) the 
model of LNG projects based on long-term contracts and fixed destinations 
started to be challenged by investors looking for ways to benefit from the 
flexibility of LNG volumes. The real change began with Trinidad and Tobago 
when companies such as BG started arbitraging between the United States and 
Spain. At that time, the US market was the residual market. This gave the 
opportunity to companies involved in the LNG business to optimize their 
portfolios, with cargoes actually going to a great variety of Asian, European 
and Latin American countries. The commercial structure of the different LNG 
trains (the liquefaction and purification facilities of LNG plants) of Trinidad 
and Tobago evolved: the first train was based on a merchant model, the other 
three on a tolling model, with gas producers acting as merchants and 
sometimes shippers, and buyers acting as shippers. Increasing flexibility in 
shipping assisted to this transformation: around 14 of the 101 ships delivered 
over the period 2002-07 were not committed to long-term agreements. At the 
same time, gas producers acquired shares in the LNG regasification terminals, 
notably in Europe, reinforcing the possibility for arbitrage. (Corbeau et al., 
2014) 
Meanwhile, the capital costs of gas liquefaction started to decline 
from 1990 to 2003, before increasing again. This created a surge of interest in 
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the LNG business and would eventually lead to the emergence of new LNG 
plants in the early 2000s. The inflexible business model also began to weaken 
as some merchant companies emerged willing to take the advantage of price 
arbitrage opportunities. In the years following, some LNG projects continued 
to diverge from the point-to-point model. Meanwhile, some also offered HH-
indexed prices. Some of examples are presented below: (Corbeau et al., 2014)  
 Yemen LNG: Yemen LNG submitted and won a competitive 
bid to supply Kogas, launched in August 2004. A sales and 
purchase agreement (SPA) was then signed with Suez LNG 
Trading for the US market, and it secured an additional LNG 
purchase commitment from its main foreign shareholder, Total. 
The deal with Total was on a DES basis, with LNG to be 
delivered at specific ports in the United States while the others 
were on an FOB basis. The deal to supply gas to the US market 
was renegotiated in 2009 to allow for the redirection of LNG to 
more lucrative Asian markets.  
 Sabine Pass and the other US projects can be considered the 
ultimate move away from a point to-point model with oil 
indexation, as they offer both HH-based indexation as well as 
FOB deliveries. In practice, Cheniere is not concerned about 
the destination or utilisation of the LNG plant since the 
capacity has been booked on a long-term basis. This means that 
it will always receive the tolling fee even if LNG remains 
undelivered because the buyer opts to not take it. 
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Most projects over the past decade had been relatively cheap to 
develop. The source of these projects was production from conventional gas 
fields, limiting project complexity. In contrast, newer projects are more 
expensive: Angola LNG and Russia’s Sakhalin are respectively 50% and 75% 
more expensive than Qatar. Norway’s Snøhvit is almost twice as expensive as 
Qatar’s LNG projects, and Australia’s LNG projects are even more expensive. 
For instance, Pluto project reached FID in 2007 and was initially planned to 
be completed by late 2010, but the first train was completed only in May 2012. 
As a consequence, the project costs increased from USD 11 billion to USD 15 
billion, or about USD 5.4/MBtu. The higher costs can be attributed to the 
greenfield nature of the projects and the environmental and regulatory 
difficulties. (Corbeau et al., 2014) 
On the basis of the aforementioned we found it rational to add a 
dummy variable - delivery terms FOB in accordance with INCOTERMS 2000 
in order to control for the effect of more flexibility in terms of destination and 
emanating possible arbitrage opportunities on the duration of the long-term 
LNG sale and purchase agreements. (Niyazmuradov & Heo, 2017a,b)  
Hypothesis 3: Availability of FOB delivery terms can have an effect on the 
length of the LNG contracts. 
Technological progress 
Technological innovation enables exploration and production of 
natural gas in more efficient, safe and environmentally friendly manner. 
While technological change and innovation is observed along all links of the 
gas value chain we focus on the expansion of LNG carrier capacity. The 
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difference in vessel size was chosen as a proxy for technological change as 
bigger tankers lead to economies of scale and more significant effect while 
LNG cargoes are re-directed. (Niyazmuradov & Heo, 2017a,b) 
LNG carriers vary in size and recent additions indicate a bias towards 
larger vessels. Forty five Q-Class tankers: Q-Flex (210,000-217,000 cm) and 
Q-Max (261,700-266,000 cm), which make up 11% of the active fleet are 
LNG vessels with largest capacities. Before the introduction of Q-Class 
vessels the average capacity of LNG tankers was in the range between 
125,000 cm and 150,000 cm. In the beginning of 2017 only half of the fleet 
had a capacity within this range, while 36% of the active global fleet was in 
the 150,000 to 180,000 cm range. At the same time carriers delivered in 2016 
had an average capacity of 173,600 cm and average capacity in the orderbook 
172,000 cm at the end of 2016. Furthermore, tanker storage capacity 
continues to grow as charterers prefer larger tankers that reduce the unit cost 
of transported LNG. (IGU, 2017, pp. 35-44)  
Technological progress is likely to result in increased gas supply 
which can result in the shorter duration of the long-term contracts. 
(Niyazmuradov & Heo, 2017a,b)  
Hypothesis 4: Technological progress will result in shorter length of LNG 
contracts. 
An increase in fleet size 
The LNG shipping sector is cyclical in nature. Shipping companies have 
dramatically increased their fleet sizes in expectation of high demand in the 
aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear crisis. It outpaced the incremental growth 
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in globally traded LNG during this period. In 2016 average estimated spot 
charter rates for steam vessels averaged at ~$20,500/day and for dual fuel 
diesel electric (DFDE)/ tri-fuel diesel electric (TFDE) to ~$33,500/day. The 
continuous wave of newbuilds hitting the market in 2017 is likely to further 
push the LNG shipping market deeper into a period of oversupply. In the 
beginning of the 2017 LNG carrier fleet consisted of 439 LNG tankers of 
which 23 vessels were chartered as FSRUs and three as floating storage units. 
At the same time liquefaction capacity planned to come online during 2017 
can potentially absorb some of the excess capacity. Furthermore, a bulk of 
newbuild vessels were ordered on a speculative basis, not tied to any specific 
project. Moreover, as of end of 2016, the order book included 121 tankers 
expected to be delivered through 2022 of which the only 66% currently 
booked to be tied to the specific charterer. Finally, LNG fleet’s age is quite 
young as 56% of the fleet is under 10 years. (IGU, 2017, pp. 35-44) 
FSRUs are in high demand at the moment as project developers are 
starting to look towards emerging markets. They are ideal for markets that 
have stagnant or dwindling domestic gas production, or looking to switch 
from expensive liquid fuels to gas in a relatively short period of time with 
limited capital expenditures. The relief to oversupplied tonnage can come 
from ship owners interest in conversion of some of their existing vessels into 
FSRUs.  
To sum up, the increase in fleet size creates an opportunity for spot 
trading growth beyond the long-term contractual obligations. Therefore the 
following hypothesis has been stated: 
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Hypothesis 5: An increase in LNG fleet size will be inversely related to the 
contract duration.  
To sum up we believe aforementioned factors will contribute to 
flexibility of gas trade. The gas market liberalization allows third party access 
to the gas transportation infrastructure leading to increase the number of 
players, fosters the development of spot markets and allows the use of 
financial derivatives in order to hedge the volume and price risks. Economic 
recession pushes down the demand for commodities, including the natural gas 
due to anemic state of the economic activity during that period. Technological 
change allows shipping higher volumes of gas between regional gas markets 
and increase in the fleet size raises the number of uncommitted ships 
(subsequently decreases charter rates) to be used in the case of lucrative price 
differentials among regional markets or when the buyer is not in the need for 
specific LNG cargo. In the same vein FOB contracts have a potential to foster 
cargo diversion among markets which can push regional price markets toward 
convergence. As a result, these changes may largely affect the market share of 
traditional exporters in different regional gas markets due to increase in 
competition and downward slope in price as more volumes become 
technically available between different markets, gas moving to the places 
where it is needed the most.  
We have constructed three models: Pipeline Gas Contracts Model, 
LNG Contracts Model and All Gas Contracts Model. The reason behind it is 
the fact that pipeline gas has rigid export infrastructure that usually ties single 
exporter and importer or limited number of them. On the contrary, liquefied 
natural gas is more mobile. Therefore, while it also requires specific 
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infrastructure, it can be delivered to various markets. The second point is that 
the LNG industry is quite young and just started evolving rigorously in the 
recent two decades basically thanks to the high oil prices in the 2011–2014. 
The third point is that the significant players can be different in pipeline gas 
and LNG markets. For instance, the biggest LNG importer is Japan – the 
country that has no access to pipeline gas. 
20
  
3.5 Data and Methodology 
The dataset comprises 573 long-term contracts (for pipe gas – 124 and 
449 for LNG) concluded between 1963 and 2015. The data has been collected 
from various publicly available sources: The data documentation by 
Newmann A., Ruester S. and von Hirchhausen C. (2015): Long-Term 
Contracts in the Natural Gas Industry – Literature Survey and Data on 426 
Contracts (1965-2014)
21
, Annual LNG Industry Reports by International 
Group of Liquefied Natural Gas Importers (GIIGNL) and Annual IGU World 
LNG Reports by International Gas Union (IGU).  The dataset represents 
around 80% of all gas export contracts. Furthermore, the data from BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy 2016 was used for quantification of some 
variables. 
Contract duration and contracted volume are determined 
simultaneously when an LNG seller and buyer agree for a supply arrangement, 
                                                          
20 Niyazmuradov S. & Heo E. (2017). Long-term gas contracts evolution in the changing 
industry environment, Geosystem Engineering, pp.3-4, available at 
https://doi.org/10.1080/12269328.2017.1341348. 





both represent endogenous variables. (Ruester, 2009; Niyazmuradov & Heo, 
2017a,b) Therefore, the error distributions cannot be considered independent 
of these regressors’ distributions. Furthermore, OLS results may be biased as 
the values of the variable -contract duration- are limited to a lower bound of 
zero, affecting distribution of errors and over-presentation of longer-term 
agreements (Masten and Saussier, 2002; Maddala 1983). Joskow (1987) and 
Crocker and Masten (1988) accounted for those problems using maximum 
likelihood estimation methods. Moreover, long-term contracts usually occur 
in clusters at discrete intervals, which may cause heteroscedasticity. 
(Newmann et al., 2015) Therefore, the models are estimated by two-stage 
least squares (2SLS)  method. The right-hand side endogenous variable 
(LN_T_VOL) is regressed on all system exogenous variables as well as on the 
instrumental variable(s) in the first stage. The fitted values are used as 
instrument in the second stage. Furthermore, we verify the results via use of 
generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation, which accounts for 
heteroscedasticity of error distributions and limited information maximum 
likelihood (LIML) instrumental variable regression, which may lead to less 
bias and confidence intervals with better coverage rates than 2SLS estimator. 
(Poi, 2006; Stock et al., 2002)  
We consider the following structural model: 
𝛾1 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝛾2 + 𝛽2𝓏1+… + 𝛽𝑘𝓏𝑘−1 + 𝓊₁    (1) 
𝛾2  is clearly endogenous as it is correlated with 𝓊₁ , 𝓏𝑘−1 and 
z₁ indicates the set of exogenous variables uncorrelated with u₁ and 𝛾₂  is 
52 
 
suspected of being correlated with u₁. Therefore, we need an instrumental 
variable 𝓏𝑘 for 𝛾₂. The variable 𝓏𝑘 must be uncorrelated with error term and 
correlated with endogenous variable to become valid IV. The second 
condition can be checked through estimation of the reduced form equation: 
𝛾2 = 𝛱₀ + 𝛱₁𝓏₁ + 𝛱₂𝓏𝑘 + 𝜗₂    (2) 
where,  E (ϑ₂)=0,  Cov (z₁, 𝜗₁)=0 and Cov (𝓏𝑘 , ϑ₂) = 0. Additional 
assumptions for statistical inference are that there are no perfect linear 
relationships among the exogenous variables and homoscedasticity of error 
term. (Wooldridge, 2009) In order to control for heteroscedasticity we use 
robust standard errors.  
We define long-term contracts as concluded between gas exporter and 
importer for the duration of more than four years as in Newmann and von 
Hirschhausen (2004). The contract length (CD) is a good proxy for the 
intensity of the relationship between the seller and the buyer (Crocker and 
Masten, 1988). In order to check the first two hypotheses we introduce 
(LIB_DUM) and (POST2008).  (LIB_DUM) identifies all long-term contracts 
that have been signed after 1998, when the First Natural Gas Directive 
1998/30/EC came into effect. This variable enables us to check the effect of 
transition to more competitive market arrangements. Intuitively we expect that 
the duration of the long-term agreements may have shortened due to global 
economic recession of 2008. This is the logic for inclusion of the (POST2008) 
dummy variable. 
Table 3.2 Summary statistics for Pipeline Gas Contracts Model variables. 
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Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE     
CD: Contract duration 19.44758 8.116734 5 39 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES     
YoS: Year in which the contract was signed 1994.387 10.98092 1965 2012 
IMP_INDIA:   = 1 if the importer is India 
                         = 0 otherwise 
.0080645 .0898027 0 1 
IMP_CHINA:  = 1 if the importer is China 
                         = 0 otherwise 
.0080645 .0898027 0 1 
TKM_DUM:   =1 if the exporter is 
Turkmenistan 
                         =0 otherwise 
.0241935 .154273 0 1 
NED_DUM:    =1 if the exporter is 
Netherlands                    
                        =0 otherwise 
.0645161 .2466667 0 1 
NOR_DUM:   =1 if the exporter is Norway 
                        =0 otherwise 
.2983871 .4594065 0 1 
RUS_DUM:    =1 if the exporter is Russia 
                        =0 otherwise 
.2741935 .4479168 0 1 
BUY_UK:      =1 for UK buyer; 
                        =0 otherwise 
.0725806 .2604994 0 1 
BUY_GER:    =1 for German buyer; 
                        =0 otherwise 
.2419355 .4299928 0 1 
LNOIL: Average price for Brent during the 
year the contract was signed (USD/bbl.) 
3.664326 .5595649 2.396075 4.764138 
LNDIFFOIL: Average price for Brent during 
the year the contract was signed (USD/bbl.) 
3.683191 .5527986 2.396075 4.764138 
POST2008:     =1 for contracts signed after 
2008 
                        =0 otherwise 
.0564516 .231728 0 1 
LIB_DUM:    =1 for contracts signed during 
or after 1998,  
                         =0 otherwise 
.4435484 .4988184 0 1 
UK_DUM:      =1 if the exporter is UK 
                        =0 otherwise 
.0645161 .2466667 0 1 
LN_T_Vol: Total contracted volume 3.609086 1.408428 .6931472 6.802395 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES     
LN_W_VOL: Weekly gas offtake volume  -3.1963 1.151436 -5.8511 -.55278 
EXP_MIDDLEEAST:  =1 if the seller is 
located in Middle East  
                                      =0 otherwise 
.016129 .1264828 0 1 
For the purpose of verification of the last three hypotheses regarding 
the LNG Contracts Model the following variables were introduced. In order to 
differentiate the effect of flexible destination contracts (FOB_DUM) variable 
is included. The variable (FLEETCAP) is proxy for the effect of the change in 
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LNG tanker fleet on the length of the LTC’s. (TECH_PROG) enables us to 
test our fifth hypothesis.  
Now let’s overview the control variables used in three models. 
(3RD_ENER_PKG) dummy variable assists in observing whether the length 
of the contracts has become even shorter after adoption of Third Energy 
Package on 3 September 2009. Core elements of the package 
include: ownership unbundling,  establishment of a National regulatory 
authority in each Member State. 
We expect that contract length should be inversely related to the year 
of signature (YoS) and positive relation between contract length and total 
contracted volumes (LN_T_Vol) implying that higher volumes agreed upon in 
the contract mean a foresight with respect to income streams for investing 
parties. (LNG_DUM) is used to account for countries possessing 
infrastructure to import both pipe gas and LNG. 
Table 3.3 Summary statistics for All Contracts Model variables. 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DEPENDENT 
VARIABLE 
    
CD: Contract duration 21.77105 84.58586 4 2032 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES     
LN_T_Vol: Total contracted volume 3.138305 1.291205 -3.827135 6.802395 
GASTYPE:   =1 for  pipeline gas 
                      =0 otherwise 
.2181501 .4133507 0 1 
YoS: The year in which the contract 
was signed 
2001.195 11.54197 1963 2015 
LNG_DUM:  =1 if the importer 
possesses both pipeline and LNG 
import infrastructure 
                       =0 otherwise 
.4108818 .492456 0 1 
EXP_CONT_EUR:  =1 if the 
exporter is located in Continental 
Europe 
                                 =0 otherwise 
.1409774 .3483258 0 1 
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EXP_N_AMERICA: =1 if the 
exporter is located in North America 
                                   =0 otherwise 
.0625 .2422842 0 1 
EXP_S_AMERICA:  =1 if the 
exporter is located in South America 
                                    =0 otherwise 
.0349265 .1837626 0 1 
EXP_MIDDLEEAST: =1 if the 
exporter is located in Middle East 
                                     =0 otherwise 
.1433824 .3507849 0 1 
EXP_AFRICA: =1 if the exporter is 
located in Africa 
                           =0 otherwise 
.1636029 .3702553 0 1 
EXP_SE_ASIA: =1 if the exporter is 
located in Southeast Asia 
                            =0 otherwise 
.1783088 .3831248 0 1 
IMP_NE_ASIA: =1 if the importer is 
located in Continental Europe 
                            =0 otherwise 
.4363002 .496359 0 1 
EXP_AUS:     =1 if the exporter is 
Australia 
                        =0 otherwise 
.125 .3310233 0 1 
IMP_INDIA:  =1 if the importer is 
India 
                        =0 otherwise 
.061296 .2400827 0 1 
IMP_CHINA: =1 if the importer is 
China 
                        =0 otherwise 
.0700525 .2554593 0 1 
FSU_DUM:    =1 if the exporter is 
one of the Former Soviet Union 
countries 
                        =0 otherwise 
.106814 .3091614 0 1 
TKM_DUM:  =1 if the exporter is 
Turkmenistan 
                        =0 otherwise 
.0055249 .0741921 0 1 
BUY_UK:      =1 for UK buyer; 
                        =0 otherwise 
.0394973 .19495 0 1 
BUY_GER:    =1 for German buyer; 
                        =0 otherwise 
.05386 .2259441 0 1 
LNOIL: Average price for Brent 
during the year the contract was 
signed (USD/bbl.) 
3.9646 .5870999 2.396075 4.764138 
LNDIFFOIL: Average price for 
Brent during the year the contract 
was signed (USD/bbl.) 
3.968492 .5994631 2.396075 4.764138 
POST2008:   =1 for contracts signed 
after 2008 
                      =0 otherwise 
.3176265 .4659601 0 1 
LIB_DUM: =1 for contracts signed 
during or after 1998 
                       =0 otherwise 
.6963351 .4602415 0 1 
3RD_EN_PKG .2792321 .4490138 0 1 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE     




In order to look into the relation between contract length and technical 
and institutional specifics of exporting and importing countries or region(s); 
continental, regional and country dummies have been incorporated in all 
models. For importers we check China, India and Northeast Asia who have 
been the most eager consumer markets. (BUY_UK) is liable for contracts of 
UK importers, who clearly operate in a liberalized framework while 
(BUY_GER) represents German importer, functioning on Continental 
European markets. (GASTYPE) looks into differences in contract length 
between pipeline and LNG deliveries.  
Given the traditional oil price indexation of LTC’s (usually with 
several months lag) higher oil price might provide disincentives for the buyer 
to enter into a long-term contract. Therefore, we include (LNOIL) and 
(LNDIFFOIL) representing oil prices prevailing in the year of signature and 
during the year before.  
For the second model we introduce additional variables specific to 
LNG markets. The dummy variable (BUY_US_UK) is the proxy for 
liberalized gas markets, while (BUY_J_K_T) indicates the Asia-Pacific 
importers who solely rely on LNG imports. Furthermore, we add the 
(BUY_CHN) to look into the case of buyer who owns a pipeline and LNG gas 
import facilities. (SEL_QAT) looks into the contracts of the biggest LNG 
exporter - Qatar. Moreover, the variable (GAS_CONS_GROWTH) is added 
in order to check the effect of global gas consumption growth on the length of 
the newly concluded liquefied natural gas SPAs.  
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Table 3.4 Summary statistics for LNG Contracts Model variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE     
CD: Contract duration 22.47178 95.86102 4 2032 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES     
POST2008:    =1 for contracts signed after 
2008 
                       =0 otherwise 
.3878924 .487817 0 1 
LIB_DUM:   =1 for contracts signed during or 
after 1998 
                      =0 otherwise 
.7511211 .432849 0 1 
GAS_CONS_GROWTH: Annual gas 
consumption growth 
.0235556 .0248888 -.026 .078 
FOB_DUM : =1 if the FOB delivery terms are 
stipulated in the contract; 
                      =0 otherwise 
.343949 .4757825 0 1 
BUY_US_UK:  =1 if the buyer is located in 
the competitive markets of US or UK 
                          =0 otherwise 
.0956938 .2945233 0 1 
BUY_CHN:   =1 if the buyer is China 
                       =0 otherwise 
.0421836 .2012577 0 1 
BUY_J_K_T:  =1 if the buyer is located in the 
Pacific basin 
                        =0 otherwise 
.5693069 .4957872 0 1 
SEL_QAT:   =1 if the seller is Qatar 
                      =0 otherwise 
.1358025 .3430024 0 1 
LN_TECH_PROG: measured as the 
difference between the tanker with biggest 
LNG transport capacity less average tanker 
capacity in each year observed 
10.78188 .8642614 9.711613 11.76837 





LN_FLEETCAP: LNG fleet total capacity in 
the specific year 
16.81298 1.368425 .0094542 17.99697 
INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES     
LN_W_VOL: Weekly gas offtake volume -3.7427 .9814 -8.4281 -1.5125 
SELF_SUFF_p: Self-sufficiency of the 
importing country (domestic gas 
production/domestic consumption) 
27.6639 102.9555 0 1686.372 
To account for endogeneity in the (LN_T_VOL) variable we define 
three instrumental variables:  (LN_W_VOL), which represents weekly gas 
offtake volume by the importer; (SELF_SUFF_p) indicating the gas self-
sufficiency ratio of the importer and (EXP_MIDDLEEAST) is a dummy 
variable which is equal to one when the exporter is located in the Middle East. 
In our opinion LN_W_VOL unlike yearly contracted volumes neither agreed 
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upon simultaneously with contract length on the course of negotiations nor 
stipulated in the contract. 
3.6 Empirical results 
First of all, comparison of results for ordinary least squares regression and 
instrumental variable regression indicates that coefficients are different. It was 
confirmed by Hausman test chi2 statistic of  66.86 (p=0.0000) for Model  1, 
30.29 (p=0.0000) for the second model and 88.60 (0.0000) for last one, 
clearly indicating that the difference in OLS and IV coefficients is systematic. 
Furthermore, first stage regression results support the significance of IV’s in 
both models. As a result we use IV regression results for interpretation. 
Table 3.5 The results of Endogeneity test 
 Model 1: 
Pipeline Gas 
Contracts 
p-value Model 2: 
LNG 
contracts 











5831.75 (0.0000) 836.78 (0.0000) 121.962 (0.0000) 
The results for the (LIB_DUM) in the Tables 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 indicate 
that our first hypothesis has been supported. After the start of the gas market 
restructuring in the Continental Europe the length of contracts has shortened 
for around four years on average for pipeline gas contracts, around 1.5 years 
for LNG deals and 3.65 years for both contracts. Interesting results came up 
regarding the second hypothesis. While pipeline gas contracts became on 
average 4 years shorter, the chilled gas deals were 3.25 years longer due to 
59 
 
recession. As we have mentioned earlier the demand for gas decreases during 
the recession. Due to uncertainty regarding future gas demand, buyers may be 
willing to go into LNG trade deals, possibly with flexible destinations, in 
order secure flexible volumes if the local market does not recover after the 
recession period ends. Rigid pipeline gas infrastructure does not allow gas re-
direction to far away markets. Regarding the third hypothesis the results 
indicate that availability of FOB delivery terms increases the length of the 
contract by 1.8 years. It may imply that more flexibility in terms of 
destination motivate importers as well as aggregators such as Shell or BP to 
increase their resource portfolio and security of supply. They might be 
foreseeing that during the periods when price spreads are high it is possible to 
profit from arbitrage opportunities by diverting cargoes to more lucrative 
markets. 
Table 3.6 Test for over identifying restrictions 
 Pipeline Gas Contracts Model LNG Contracts Model 
Score chi2 (1) 1.85495 (p=1.85495) 1.41508 (p=0.2342) 
 
Table 3.7 Results for Model 1: Long-term contracts for the sale and purchase of 
pipeline natural gas. (Pipeline Gas Contracts Model) 









































































































































































































































No of observations 124 124 124 124 124 
F or Wald chi2 
statistic 
17.51 6730.30 1352.96 1352.96 1351.23 
R-squared 0.7086 0.8941 0.6887 0.6887 0.6877 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. 
The signs of the coefficients for the estimates related to the last two 
hypotheses came up in line with our expectation. The increase in the LNG 
tanker fleet and technological progress has resulted in the -0.036 (-3.60/100) 
and -0.006 (-0.6/100) years shorter LNG contracts. Low charter rates due to 
oversupply in LNG shipping market and technological development allowing 
economies of scale are likely to lead to ampler supplies therefore decreasing 
the incentives to be locked into the longer-term gas purchase deals. 
Regarding other variables we found negative coefficients for: 
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 Oil price (-6.30) and (-2.493)22: The importers might be reluctant to 
be locked into agreements stipulating high base price; 
 The oil price in the previous year (7.81) and (2.65): Higher crude oil 
prices in the previous year may have motivated buyers to secure 
supplies for a longer-term in order to provide security of supply in 
case if the price trends were in the year before will keep their 
prevalence for a longer period. 
 Year of signature (-.0.08) and (-.013)23: It might be due to increasing 
supply, which decreases supplier switching costs as new projects are 
coming online. 
Table 3.8  Results for Model 2: Long-term contracts for the sale and purchase of 
pipeline and liquefied natural gas. (All Contracts Model) 
Econometric model OLS  IV estimation 
Method of 
estimation 
 First stage 
regression 
2 SLS GMM LIML 
Independent 
variables 





























































































































                                                          
22 Note: Estimated coefficients are from pipeline and all contracts models. 

































































































































































No of observations 481 481 481 481 481 
F or Wald chi2 
statistic 
13.69 252.35 331.70 331.70 331.70 
R-squared 0.4598 0.8070 0.4180 0.4180 0.4180 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. 
The estimates for BUY US_UK, UK_DUM, and BUY_UK indicate 
that when the exporter or importer is located in the competitive market the 
length of all contracts tend to be around 1, 3 and 6 (4.6 in Pipeline Gas 
Contracts Model) years shorter on average. It may be due to availability of 
pipeline gas, LNG supplies and local gas production; increased competition 
among market players thanks to third party access to gas transportation 
infrastructure and mature financial markets offering gas derivatives for 
hedging risks. Norway contracts are 2.40 years longer on average. Results 
regarding Turkmenistan indicate 6 and 3.88 years longer length of contracts 
on average in Pipeline Gas and All Contracts models respectively. Huge 
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investments into the giant Galkynysh field along with the plans for boosting 
gas production by 2030 up to 230 bcm motivates conclusion of the longer 
term export deals.  
The results for the gas importers indicate that economic development 
locomotives of China and India along with industrialized countries of North 
East Asia who has access only to LNG supplies prefer lengthier agreements.  
Table 3.9 Results for Model 3: Long-term contracts for the sale and purchase of 
liquefied natural gas. (LNG Contracts Model) 
Econometric 
model 
OLS  IV estimation 
Method of 
estimation 
OLS First stage 
regression 




































































































































































































187 164 164 164 164 
F or Wald 
chi2 statistic 
24.29 425.55 195.03 194.68 194.53 
R-squared 0.5195 0.9288 0.5166 0.5159 0.5174 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are in parenthesis. *, **, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. 
The adoption of the Third Energy Package led to further decrease (-
5.19) in the duration of the contracts.   
We chose exporter situated in competitive market as the base group 
for comparison in the case of gas exporter continents and countries.  Results 
imply that the contracts signed by exporters from other continents, regions or 
countries are several years longer. It might be due to greenfield nature of the 
deposits as in the case of Australia or huge investments into regasification 
facilities in North America in order to monetize plentiful production of 
unconventional gas. However, the most important factor might be a target to 
ensure demand security for a longer possible term as it presupposes revenue 
stream for subsequent period. Results regarding the Former Soviet Union 
countries indicate 5.1 years longer length of contracts. Utilization of long 
distance pipeline to Europe, production complexity in the terrain of Siberia in 
the case of Russia motivates them for the conclusion of the longer term export 
deals. Finally, the growth in the worldwide gas consumption has a positive 




Unlike previous studies we approach the issue of long-term contracts 
from the exporter countries’ perspective.  
The following factors necessitate long-term contracts for the gas 
exporter countries: (Hartley, 2014; Crocker and Masten, 1991)  
 They serve as strong basis for the investment in gas 
infrastructure; 
 Allow for proper distribution of market risks; 
 Decrease the ex-post costs; 
 Ensure the demand security for the produced gas; 
 Assist exporter in establishing market share in the buyer’s 
market and in maintaining it for the duration of the contract. 
Therefore, for policymakers, understanding the change in the duration 
of contracts is a prerequisite for revenue flow planning, maintaining future 
demand security and market share in the importing country for the commodity 
gas produced. 
Our models’ estimation results clearly indicate the fact that a number 
of global and industry specific events have contributed to the decrease of LTC 
duration. The evidence from gas market restructuring in Continental Europe 
might give clues on possible direction (shorter contracts) of the changes that 
might happen after the gas liberalization processes occur in other big markets 
of gas such as Japan.   
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The probability of the future with shorter contract duration was 
further confirmed by negative sign and statistically significant coefficient of 
the variables: year of signature, technological development and LNG tanker 
fleet capacity. These factors are likely to persist for years to come, further 
decreasing the length of contractual ties between exporter and importers.  
The rise in the length of LTC’s concluded during the recession period 
reflects precautionary demand associated with market concerns about the 
availability of future oil supplies rather than due to immediate needs of buyers. 
To sum up, the results suggest that the duration of the long-term 
contracts will further shorten leaving gas producing countries with the issue of 
searching for and discovering the instruments that are additional or 
complementary to the conclusion of long-term gas sales and purchase 
contracts in terms of planning and ensuring future cash flow stability, 
provision of the demand security for the produced gas, minimizing transaction 
costs for renegotiation and enforcement of long-term contracts and foreseeing 




PART III FLEXIBILITY IN THE NATURAL 
GAS TRADE AND LONG-TERM CONTRACTS 
Chapter 4 Empirical analysis of the factors that 
affect the choice of flexible destination clause in 
the long-term liquefied natural gas contracts 
4.1 Introduction 
Traditionally liquefied natural gas exporters and importers have relied 
on long-term natural gas sale and purchase agreements (hereinafter referred as 
SPA) in trade deals. The main features of those contracts included: take-or-
pay clause for a minimum specified volume, 20+ years length, dedicated ships 
and destination clauses making the chilled gas trade point-to-point. Long-term 
contracts have been ensuring distribution of market risks among parties, 
taking into account considerable capital investments for the development of 
the LNG infrastructure that made possible the trade between the seller and the 
buyer to happen. However, contractual arrangements between chilled gas 
buyers and sellers have become more flexible due to ongoing inclination 
towards trade in spot and short-term markets, which have increased ten-fold 
since 2000, currently making up 29% of total LNG sales or 71.9 million tons 
(MT). (Crocker & Masten, 1991, Joskow, 1987; Newmann & Hirchhausen, 




IGU (2016a) highlights the importance of the following factors while 
explaining vigorous growth in the non-long-term trade: 
 The growth in the number of LNG contracts with destination 
flexibility;  
 The rise in the number of market players thanks to cheaper gas prices 
and deployment of new technologies, such as FSRU and FLNG;  
 The reliance on the spot markets to cope with sudden demand changes 
in the markets of Japan, Korea and Taiwan, which lack pipeline gas 
imports;  
 Increasing number of uncommitted LNG cargoes thanks to cheaper 
coal prices in Continental Europe, increased unconventional gas 
production in North America and start-up of new projects in Australia;   
 High price differentials between regional gas markets made arbitrage 
a lucrative strategy;  
 Substantial rise in the number of uncommitted LNG tankers. 
 Expiration of number of long-term contracts, which have not been 
prolonged or prolonged on more flexible terms; 
 Reloading capacity additions in a number of countries. 
Energy efficiency measures, significant increase in green energy 
generation and slowdown in Asian consumption contributed to the decline in 
the demand for flexible volumes from its peak of above 60 bcm reached in 
2013. The demand for global flexible supplies was led by Japan and Latin 
America with the share of 45% and 20% respectively. Another notable pattern 
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is the increase in the number of less established market players aiming to 
benefit from the low prices by tapping into short-term deals. Moreover, highly 
price sensitive demand in Asian developing countries is projected to rise by 
40% (compared to 2016) to reach 350 bcm in 2021. For instance, lower gas 
prices enabled higher utilization of gas-fired capacity in India and Pakistan 
and boosted incremental demand in China and ASEAN countries. (IEA, 2016, 
pp.33-36)  
Gas market liberalization in North America and UK along with 
prohibition of inclusion of destinatination clauses in the contracts with 
Continental Europe have allowed the buyers, sometimes on the basis of the 
agreement with the seller and in other cases independently to divert bought 
LNG cargoes to more lucrative markets in the presence of arbitrage 
opportunities given by price signals less transportation costs. Furthermore, 
India and Japan are planning to follow this trend in order to promote a 
transparent and diversified gas market.
24
 While it is early to argue that the 
cargo redirection have become a routine in the global LNG trade, it has 
happened frequently mostly due to over-contractedness of the buyer at the 
intended LNG market or motivation to benefit from arbitrage opportunities. 
For example, the price spread between Japanese and European gas markets 
were on average 6 US dollars per MMBtu between 2011 and 2015. Around 30% 
of the demand for flexible volumes is covered by direct diversions or reloads 
of the supplies initially contracted to a specific country. Diversions and 
                                                          
24 India, Japan to push for removal of destination clause in LNG contracts, India Business 




reloads exploit stronger reliance on pipeline imports and fuel switching in the 
power sector - embedded in the gas system of the intended country to free up 
LNG volumes for where they are most needed. Today, the aggregate 
overcontracted position in global LNG markets is around 70 bcm, and despite 
the fact that the production underperformance of some LNG exports has offset 
some of that it remains high. (IEA, 2016, p. 43) 
To sum up, the dynamics of the system can be described as: an 
unforeseen high level of US domestic production, lower than anticipated 
demand levels and the huge growth in destination flexible LNG supply. 
(Rogers, 2010) 
In this part of the dissertation global LNG market and trade flexibility 
brought by the ability of liquefied natural gas cargo diversions is explored. As 
it was mentioned in the previous part, the incorporation of FOB delivery 
terms into the LNG SPA’s in accordance with INCOTERMS 2000 of 
International Chamber of Commerce enables to pass the risks and 
subsequently the cargo ownership from the seller to the buyer at port of 
loading, allowing the buyer diversion of the LNG cargo. “Accordingly, unless 
there are other contractual provisions that purport to limit the buyer’s ability 
to resell or send the LNG to whatever destination he chooses under an FOB 
contract, the buyer may have almost complete destination freedom (subject to 
shipping and other commercial constraints.” (Frinzio, 2016) However, DES or 
DAT contracts (DES was removed from Incoterms 2010) presuppose that the 
risks and subsequently the cargo ownership are retained by the seller until the 
LNG is unloaded at its destination thus making cargo re-export possible for 
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the buyer conditional on owning cargo reloading facilities or by negotiating 
with the seller. In this case, the seller is responsible for shipping costs. Finally, 
reloading the LNG to another vessel for re-export requires additional costs 
from importer further squeezing or withering away potential profit from 
arbitraging. 
In our opinion the flexibility has been brought by the possibility of the 
cargo diversion may largely affect the status quo of long-term gas contracts in 
the future. Today most of the LNG projects are greenfield in nature and the 
industry itself is relatively young as it started to function rigorously in the 
beginning of the 2000s. However, in the mid- and long-term future when the 
industry becomes more established and most of initial long-term contracts 
concluded for the trade of LNG from greenfield projects expire it may alter 
the whole status quo of the global natural gas industry. The growth of the spot 
and short-term LNG trade may reduce the size of the long-term pipeline gas 
resulting in higher dynamics of gas-to-gas competition in the world markets 
squeezing revenue income for gas exporting developing countries. The 
revenue is used for the investment in infrastructure, capacity building and 
human resource development. 
While there is a growing trend towards relaxation of terms that limit 
destinations under long term contracts, substantial portion of contracts 
(particularly in the Asian Pacific market) still restrict destinations and resale. 
This situation removes volumes with restricted destination from the ability to 
exploit arbitrage opportunities.  
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Therefore, we state the following research question: What factors 
affect the choice of the destination flexibility clause (FOB) in the liquefied 
natural gas sale and purchase contracts? 
This chapter is structured as follows: 
Section 2 provides literature review. Section 3 talks about the 
flexibility in the LNG markets and long-term contracts. Section 4 analyzes 
cargo diversion possibilities and arbitraging between gas markets. Section 5 
describes the INCOTERMS 2000 and specifies FOB and DES delivery terms. 
Section 6 defines the data and methodology. Section 7 explains empirical 
results. Finally, last section provides conclusions.   
4.2 Literature review 
The literature regarding the issue of the flexible destination clauses in 
the LNG SPAs is rather scarce. Producers use destination clauses in order to 
price the gas in relation to its competitor fuels in the destination market. (IEA, 
2016) 
The economic Law of One Price states that in the absence of 
transportation costs or any kind of economic barriers between supply and 
demand locations, commodity prices tend to converge to a single price over 
time. By means of arbitraging the price differences between locations are 
reduced to the level reflecting differences in transportation costs. (EIA, 2014) 
Zhuravleva (2009) establishes clear definition of LNG arbitrage and analyzes 
the barriers to the growth of the LNG arbitrage market. Ikonnikova et al. 
(2009) develop a two-stage model of LNG market to determine incentives to 
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enter long-term contracts vs. spot trade and to understand the causes of new 
contract terms. They found that importers with excess supply will resell to 
importers with higher than expected demand and compete with exporters 
conditional on inclusion of “flexibility option” in their contracts. Moreover, 
authors argue that the appearance of the “flexibility option” and emergence of 
spot trade result from the value of investment cost and demand uncertainty 
level.  
Cogan (2007) found that from the outset of LNG industry delivery 
terms for almost all LNG sales have been either FOB the liquefaction plant or 
DES the regasification plant in accordance with ICC’s Incoterms definitions. 
Later with the increase in the number of players and complexity of 
relationships, CIF terms have evolved, some parties are even considering 
deliveries on the high seas. Wood et al. (2008) argue that it is not necessarily 
the gas price differentials between regions but rather comparative spark 
spreads between chilled gas and competing power generation fuels (coal, 
distillate and fuel oil) that drive LNG trading for uncontracted LNG cargoes.  
Relaxation of destination restrictions has also been under debate in 
East Asia as gas is often traded under rigid long-term contracts with 
destination restrictions. These clauses are introduced for reasons such as 
securing supply and investment. (Glachant & Hallack, 2009; Thomas et al., 
2000) However, these restrictions cause inefficiency in the gas market. A 
study of real option valuation of free destinations in long-term LNG supplies 
argues that free destinations are highly likely to improve between 6% and 43% 
of the value of long-term LNG supplies (Yepes Rodríguez, 2008).  
74 
 
The emergence of competitive regulations prevents contractors from 
having any destination clauses in their sales and purchase agreements (Cogan, 
2005). For instance, EU ruled that destination restrictions are not permissible 
from a competition policy perspective and G-7 nations and APEC agreed to 
relax such restrictions (Rowley, 2014). Furthermore, the current market 
conditions favor free destinations. According to Khalilpour (2011) the LNG 
business practice is changing rapidly with increasing medium-term or short-
term contracts and a shift from DES to FOB delivery terms for a number of 
reasons, including more competition from gas market liberalization.  
Ritz (2013) argues that regional price differentials can arise because 
of LNG exporters’ market power rather than transport costs
25
. Author’s key 
point is simply that for an exporter with market power, the arbitrage process 
stops when its marginal revenues are equalized rather than prices. For instance, 
if transport costs are identical as is roughly the case for Qatar’s sales to the 
UK and Japan then export quantities are such that marginal revenues for each 
region are equal. 
Growing literature discusses whether a global spot market is emerging, 
e.g. Jensen (2004), Foss & Dietz (2005), Foss & Juckett (2005), Charter (2007) 
and whether long-term contracts are to extinct. Hartley (2015) finds that 
deeper spot markets incentivize firms to increase contract flexibility and the 
share of spot purchases. Brito and Hartley (2007) provide yet another 
rationale for LTCs: if spot markets are thin, buyers and sellers may incur 
                                                          
25 In a simple perfectly competitive model, price difference across two regions served by an 
exporter equals netback price minus transport cost for the exporter should be the same for each 




costly delays as they wait for a suitable spot-trading partner. Huitric (2007) 
argues that despite emergence of swing producers in the Middle East and 
swing customers essentially in the Atlantic, LNG markets of the Atlantic and 
Asia-Pacific will keep their own dynamics for a foreseeable future generating 
regular and sometimes significant unbalances between markets opening the 
window for further price arbitraging. At the same time, Li et al. (2014) extend 
Neumann et al. (2006) and Neumann & Cullmann (2012) by concluding that 
Asian and European gas markets are integrated because of contractual links to 
oil prices, not arbitrage in a spot market. 
Miyamoto et al. (2009) identifies the year 2004 as a time when 
changes in market fundamentals altered the relative prices of LNG inside and 
outside of Japanese contracts, triggering changes in pricing formulas. Agerton 
(2017) argues that these changes in the pricing formula were due to the 
willingness of the buyer to arbitrage between markets. 
Ebinger et al. (2012) argue that exports of U.S. natural gas will take 
advantage of the benefits of producer surplus resulting from the pricing 
differentials between the natural gas markets in the United States, Europe and 
Asia.  
4.3 Flexibility in the LNG markets and long-term 
contracts 
Long-term contracts typically for 20 years or longer duration with carefully-
structured system of risk sharing have been serving as traditional contracting 
pattern in the LNG industry. Unless the project is developed solely by a 
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national oil company, traditionally the venture partners market chilled gas as a 
group directly to specific customers and the contract designates the 
destination of cargoes. On the contrary, in self-contracting, one or more of the 
partners in the venture (or their marketing affiliates) sign the SPA with the 
venture and assume the marketing risk for the contracted volumes. The 
resulting volumes commonly become part of the seller’s supply portfolio and 
can be sold under any terms and conditions that he chooses to utilize.  
 
Figure 4.1 The upside of tolling fees and destination freedom
26
 
LNG SPAs legally bind both parties to price and quantity, and in 
many cases, effectively prevent opportunistic behavior (i.e., the possibility of 
arbitrage) with destination restrictions and reduce the exposure to the natural 
gas market based price risks through the oil indexation price mechanism. The 
stability of cash flow that subsequently enables reduction of financing cost for 
long-lived, capital investments was the key motivation for entering in long-
term contracts. (Hartley, 2014) While retaining dominance LNG SPAs went 
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 Source: IEA (2016, p.39) 
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through significant changes in recent years. For instance, “flexibility option” 
granted to buyers made possible for them to return spare volumes to a seller at 
some fee or re-export flexible volumes to benefit from arbitrage opportunities 
arising due to price spreads between regionally disparate gas markets. 
(Ikonnikova et al., 2009) Therefore, importers have been granted a room for 
maneuver when they end up with much more or much less chilled gas 
volumes due to price/demand volatility. Moreover, there is a rise in the 
number of contracts allowing buyer to re-route LNG shipments as long as the 
diverted volumes will not compete with seller’s other supplies at specified 
market(s). In this regard IGU reports that the major driver in spot and short-
term trade growth has been the increased use of diversion options in flexible 
contracts (both short and long term). In addition, hybrid pricing schemes that 
designate a portion of the fixed traded volume to be indexed to oil (e.g., 80%) 
with the remainder linked to gas hub prices. A third area of ongoing change in 
long term contracts is the inclusion of opportunities for price re-negotiation 
(e.g., every 5 years). Overall, the increasing variety of business models is used 
in natural gas markets today and the extent to which this trend continues will 
be largely dependent on buyer acceptance of greater price volatility for 
potentially lower long-term average prices. (EIA, 2014) Nevertheless, as 
suppliers have shown great reluctance to proceed with a new project without 
some degree of long-term protection the industry reliance on long-term 
contracts seems likely to remain and act as the ‘filter’ that determines the flow 
of new projects into the market.  
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Table 4.1 Recent LNG contracts by destination clause flexibility
27
 






Signed in  
2014 
Flexible 51% 1.41 20 
Fixed 49% 1.35 12 
Signed in  
2015 
Flexible 39.5% 1.55 17 
Fixed 60.5% 0.90 11 
 
4.4 Evolution of the LNG markets  
There are currently six significant regional markets importing LNG – 
Northeast Asia, Continental Europe, North America, UK, China and India. 
While Northeast Asia and Continental Europe have developed their gas 
industries based largely on imported supplies, the US and the UK have been 
relying on indigenous natural gas along with imports. China and India have 
had comparatively smaller gas industries based on domestic supplies, but now 
envision substantial growth based on chilled gas imports. These markets differ 
significantly in the balance of energy sources that compete with natural gas. 
Gas pricing in Northeast Asia and Continental Europe is a product of the price 
negotiations between the buyers and suppliers who are eager to get the highest 
possible netback for the depletion of their national resources. On the other 
hand, in the liberalized gas markets of North America and the UK gas pricing 
reflects gas-to-gas competition. China and India have a history of local gas 
pricing that has been heavily influenced by regulation. Therefore, the concept 
of a uniform international approach to LNG pricing may be a theoretical ideal, 
but it is far from a reality in current LNG markets. However, less uniformity 
in gas prices between different regions, compared to oil can be explained by 
                                                          
27 Source: IEA (2016, p.62) 
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high storage costs of gas that result in volume and price restrictions for the 
price transmission function of LNG trade through arbitrage. 
Table 4.2 Countries importing and exporting LNG in our dataset 
Exporters Importers 





Dominican Republic Colombia 
France Egypt 





Korea Republic Nigeria 
Kuwait Norway 
Lithuania Oman 
Malaysia Papua New Guinea 
Malta Qatar 
Mexico Russia 
Netherlands Trinidad and Tobago 
Poland UK 
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Figure 4.2 The classification of the global LNG markets in accordance with Jensen 
(2004) 
Regulatory reforms in some countries brought alterations to the gas 
market. Following the implementation of the FERC Order 380 in 1984 (which 
relieved buyers of their ‘take’ obligations on long-term contracts), it became 
impossible to sell LNG at oil-linked prices in the US gas market. Moreover, 
the European Commission has argued that destination clauses are not in line 
with European competition law and 1958 Treaty of Rome as they restrict free 
movements of gas, such as re-sale. The first exporter to remove the 
destination clauses from existing and also future contracts with EU customers 
was Nigerian LNG in December 2002 followed by Gazprom’s consent in July 
2002 to drop the destination clauses from all future contracts. As a result, the 
new destination flexibility has made possible for buyer to arbitrage between 
regional gas markets. Profit sharing mechanisms are usually incorporated into 
the agreement. (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007)  
Jensen (2004) defined three main regional LNG markets: Pacific 
Basin, Atlantic Basin and Middle East. The Atlantic Basin has an active 
arbitrage market involving European and US customers, and the Middle East 
has become the pricing arbitrage focal point between the Atlantic Basin and 
Northeast Asia. Moreover, buyers began to negotiate upstream equity 
positions from their suppliers as a part of new contracts. Examples of such 
equity positions include Kogas in Qatar’s Rasgas 1, Tokyo Gas and Tokyo 
Electric in Australia and China’s CNOOC in Australia’s Northwest Shelf and 
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Indonesia’s Tangguh projects. (Corbeau et al., 2014; Energy Charter 
Secretariat, 2007)  
Broadly speaking, there are three ways of delivering flexible volumes 
to those who require them: uncontracted production, contracted but divertible 
in accordance with contractual provisions and contracted but open to multiple 
destinations, such as volumes held by aggregators or portfolio players. (IEA, 
2016) In this context, our research deals with volumes that are contracted to a 
specific destination but can be redirected to another market. 
4.4.1 Flexibility provided in the form of diversions 
The supplies from Trinidad and Tobago, Nigeria, Oman, Algeria and 
Peru were actively redirected. In the period between 2004-07 Trinidad’s 
significant chilled gas volumes intended for Spanish market reached North 
American markets. Furthermore, the marketing structure of Train 4 of Atlantic 
LNG was based on tolling model. Nigeria LNG was financed by its 
shareholders (ENI, Shell, Total and the Nigerian state oil company), which 
resulted in contracting a bulk of the volumes not linked to any specific 
destination. Oman’s diversions are related with lower offtake (relative to 
contracted volumes) by Japan and Korea. In the case of Algeria, a rise in 
export capacity led to the increased diversions in 2014 and 2015. Finally, the 
contracts governing activity of the Peruvian LNG export facility retain 
destination flexibility conditional on royalty payments to the Peruvian 
government calculated as netback from the final destination. Nevertheless the 
period of intensive LNG diversions was between 2011 and 2014 as a result of 
widening price differentials across regional markets prompted by the 
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Fukushima nuclear accident in Japan. To sum up, project’s funding structure, 
host country participation and debt/equity ratio affect the level of flexible 
supply volumes that are not committed by means of long-term contracts. (IEA, 
2016) 
 
Figure 4.3 Flexibility provided by diversions
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4.4.2 Flexibility from reloading activity and North American 
export volumes 
This category of cargo diversion implies a purchase of the LNG cargo 
on a DES delivery basis, discharging it from the vessel into the storage tank 
and  subsequent reloading into another tanker. When the LNG is discharged at 
its initial destination, the buyer (re-exporter) no longer has to share potential 
profits if the gas is sold to a third party (Drewry, 2012). However, because 
unloading and reloading incur a cost and subsequently require higher price 
spreads across regional gas markets, direct diversions are more efficient way 
to re-route gas. Transaction costs related to negotiating with exporter is the 
main reason why overcontracted importers resort to reloads. 
                                                          




Figure 4.4 Share of reloadings by import country 2011-16
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According to IEA (2016) steady growth in reloads was observed in 
the period between 2011 and 2014 when they peaked at 9 bcm (dominated by 
Belgium and Spain in Europe) and fell back to 6 bcm in 2015 due to 
diminishing activity in Spain and Belgium and despite increasing in France 
and the Netherlands.  
 
Figure 4.5 Overcontracted composition of LNG importers 2011-16
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Around half of the incremental supplies up to 2021 are expected to be 
sourced from US. This fact has brought expectations on that fully flexible 
                                                          
29 Source: IEA (2016, p.57) 
30 Source: IEA (2016, p.45) 
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contractual model of large US exports will contribute to the growth of price 
arbitraging between disparate global gas markets in order to be able to timely 
react to the supply and demand shocks. Furthermore, the share of contracts 
with flexible destinations has been steadily growing. For contracts signed in 
2015 this share reached close to 60%, from just around 33% for deals signed 
before 2009. (IEA, 2016) 
On the other hand there are opinions about that today’s oversupply 
should not be regarded as a structural feature of the market as 15% of LNG 
export infrastructure has lower physical production flexibility than commonly 
perceived due to lack of feedstock gas and a combination of security issues 
and technical problems. Furthermore, it is pointed out that LNG liquefaction 
plants operate as baseload facilities resulting in a basic lack of short-term 
upswing capability in LNG production and mention about European gas 
storage operators who have come under increasing economic pressure as 
shippers have become more hesitant to book capacity because of low spreads 
between summer and winter prices. (Snow, 2016; IEA, 2016)  
Gas demand and supply are influenced by weather, seasonal gas 
consumption peaks, delay in domestic gas production, price and availability of 
competing fuels, and growing demand for cleaner and safer energy fuel. 
Therefore, short-term (less than four years contracts) LNG trade (accounting 
for 30-35 % of market) offers the flexibility to fill in the gaps caused by the 
supply shortages and to arbitrage prices between alternative LNG markets. In 
this context, Jonathan Stern, director of gas research at the Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies points out that although LNG trading is not expected to look 
85 
 
like the oil market soon, the move away from traditional supply deals is 
unavoidable. In the same vein analysts at Goldman argue that “increasingly 
assertive buyers will gradually turn away from long-term contracts.” (Anjli 
and Sheppard, 2015) Moreover, they recall the transformation of the crude oil 
trading in the mid 70’s when it took only a few years to revolution the world 
of oil trading with the rapid disappearance of the long-term contracts in favor 
of spot arrangements. For instance, according to Huitric (2007) existence of a 
strong gas-oil price relationship and the rise in short-term transactions 
supports the theory that LNG would soon be traded like oil.   
4.5 Cargo diversion and arbitraging between markets 
Given LNG’s mobile format despite the weaker price signals between 
markets due to smaller number of players and point-to-point nature of LNG 
trade in 2000s it was clear that “trading mindset would gain ground over the 
long term relationships paradigm”. (Rogers, 2010, p.37) The rise in the 
number of exporters and importers, availability of uncommitted chilled gas 
cargoes and development of arbitrage activity led to the increase in liquidity 
of the “flexible” LNG market. (Zhuravleva, 2009) 
 The main causes for regional variety in the pricing mechanisms for 
gas lies in differences in: (Energy Charter Secretariat, 2007) 
1. The development of import dependence: Natural gas rich countries 
whose gas consumption can predominantly be covered by domestic 
production have regulatory control of supply (upstream) and demand 
(downstream) thus are able to influence the gas pricing mechanism. On 
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the other hand, supply side is beyond regulatory reach of import-
dependent countries because main supply decisions influencing the 
balance between supply and demand are taken by resource owners. 
Nevertheless, they may try to influence export pricing either through 
raising the share of local production, or by diversification. 
2. The size of field: Countries possessing many small fields can achieve 
resource rent optimization by an adequate taxation regime, where 
development and depletion will be decided by individual profit-
maximizing upstream companies. However, depletion and market 
penetration rates so as to avoid flooding the export markets with gas by 
too rapid development of production at the focus of countries with 
super-giant or giant fields.  
3. Demand side: Gas consumption for heating is highly dependent on 
temperature, but has little price elasticity. Unless dual-firing equipment 
is installed the gas for smaller and medium-sized industry and for 
commercial purposes is rather price inelastic in the short-term, but in 
the longer term most customers are able to switch to gas oil or fuel oil 
by investing into new equipment. In the power sector, where gas 
competes with coal on a short- and long-term basis, average costs of 
CCGTs can be lower compared to coal-based power generation. 
However, in the short-term, gas has to compete on a marginal cost basis 
against the use of coal, which is going to drag down the gas price to the 
lower levels compared to other sectors. This is the reason why 
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exporting countries try to avoid volume expansion by selling into a 
power sector.  
4. Implications for regulation from: the development of import 
dependence, field size and demand side: Depletion policy (mainly 
speed and rent-taking by the resource owner) is the central issue of 
upstream regulation while downstream, the main issues are about 
concessions for the sale of gas, access to infrastructure (often regarded 
as a natural monopoly) and unbundling of integrated gas companies. 
Policy and regulation for the power sector has the most important 
influence on the volume and price elasticity of gas demand. For 
countries which use gas for domestic and export purposes, a question is 
whether to apply the same pricing principle domestically as for export, 
or, if not, how to deal with the resulting price differential between 
domestic and export prices. Inversely, for import-dependent countries 
with significant domestic production, the question is how to price their 
domestic production: one approach is to avoid price differentials by 
letting the price for domestic production adopt the price set or 
influenced by imported gas (as in the US, the UK, Germany, France 
and Italy); another option is to use cheaper domestic production to 
reduce the average gas supply costs or to allocate it to special consumer 
groups.  
5. Influence of political considerations on international pricing 
mechanisms: Exporter country may offer lower prices for importing 
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countries (thus giving away a portion of its resource rent to a consumer 
state) in exchange for political cooperation.  
Destination clauses restrict onward sales and limit use of gas sales 
only to contractually specified geographical market areas and thus prevent 
gas-to-gas competition.  The European Union while recognized the role of 
long-term contracts have restricted the use of destination clauses. Item 25 of 
the 2003 Gas Directive states: “Long-term contracts will continue to be an 
important part of the gas supply of Member States and should be maintained 
as an option for gas supply undertakings in so far as they do not undermine 
the objectives of this Directive and are compatible with the Treaty [of Rome, 
1958, establishing the EU], including competition rules. (Konoplyanik, 2005) 
The fragmentation of LNG deliveries incentivized by the regional 
price differentials have started since mid-2000 being delivered broadly in line 
with contractual provisions. Now let’s look into the LNG cargo diversion 
development on the example of Rogers (2010) modeling price differentials 
between Continental and North American gas prices. 
i) North American Prices Higher than European Oil-Indexed Natural 
Gas Prices: When gas prices rise to the level of residual fuel oil, fuel 
switching starts in the US power generation sector. The process results in 
the diminishing of some 70 mcm/day of gas demand. When switching is 
completed prices will continue to rise until: a switching band with 
distillates is reached and/or demand falls down in gas-intensive industries 
for the duration of the price spike. If the gas price stays high for a period 
of 4-6 month it results in drilling activity rise which will bring on new 
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supplies after one year. If the situation persists acceleration of LNG 
projects with the North American market in mind (time lag of 4 to 5 
years from sanction to new supply) is expected. In this price spread 
context, European importers have an incentive to divert flexible LNG to 
North America and increase nominations under its long-term oil-indexed 
pipeline contracts. This provides the European importer/wholesaler with 
net trading profit. As a result additional supplies of chilled gas arriving to 
North America storage inventory increases and depresses price. Europe 
will continue to divert LNG to North America and increase its take of 
oil-indexed pipeline gas until either:  
 North American prices reduce to converge on European oil-indexed 
prices (at which point there is no incentive for further arbitrage);  
 The nominations under long-term pipeline contracts reach Annual 
Contract Quantities or maximum short-term limits at which point the 
arbitrage dynamic ceases, despite a residual arbitrage price incentive.  
ii) North American Prices Lower than European Oil-Indexed Natural 
Gas Prices: If gas prices fall below the level of coal prices the gas 
demand is going to increase as coal is displaced in the power generation 
sector. The period of 4-6 months of low gas prices will lead to the 
decrease in the number of active drilling rigs. If this situation persists 
marginal LNG projects will be deferred. When later market outlook 
appears more favorable they will have 4 to 5 years lag from sanction to 
production. In this context European buyers have an incentive to buy 
flexible LNG and reduce nominations of oil-indexed pipeline imports 
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under long term contracts. This provides the European 
importer/wholesaler with a net trading profit. The reduction in LNG 
arriving in North America reduces storage inventory and increases price. 
Logically Europe will continue to buy flexible LNG and reduce its take 
of oil-indexed pipeline gas until either:  
 North American prices increase to converge with European oil-
indexed prices (at which point there is no incentive for further 
arbitrage).  
 The nominations under long-term pipeline contracts reach take or 
pay or minimum short-term limits at which point the arbitrage 
dynamic ceases, despite a residual arbitrage price incentive.  
Therefore, global natural gas markets despite their different pricing 
structures and security of supply concerns are connected by arbitrage driven 
system dynamics.  
The use of the flexibility band in Europe’s long term pipeline gas 
import contracts is an instrument for physically adding or removing gas from 
the system i.e. literally by altering upstream production levels. However the 
scope of this physical adjustment is just some 40 bcm annually in a gas 
market of 1,600 bcm/a. (Rogers, 2010, p.79) Therefore the key issue from 
supply security perspective is how much flexibility in terms of destination is 
retained by the current and incremental chilled gas supplies, which is basically 
a contractual matter. To sum up, besides the supply side, the volume 
flexibility has to come from demand-side, production, pipeline import 
flexibilities offered by different regional gas markets. (IEA, 2016) 
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4.5.1 Price arbitraging between markets  
Zhuravleva (2009) defines LNG Arbitrage “as a physical cargo 
diversion from one market to another, which offers higher price. The 
diversion of the cargo can be regarded as arbitrage if the cargo was initially 
committed to the first market and to the initial buyer in a commercial contract.” 
(Zhuravleva, 2009, p.2)  The two key drivers for arbitrage are Commercial (an 
ability to take advantage of price differentials between markets) and 
Operational (financial loss minimization in case of plant outages, overfull 
storage tanks or force majeure). In financial theory, arbitrage is defined as the 
practice of buying and selling equivalent goods in different markets to make a 
profit, without any risk or without making any investments (Berk & De Marzo, 
2011). Sharpe, Alexander & Bailey (1998, p.907) have formulated the 
following definition of arbitrage: “The simultaneous purchase and sale of the 
same, or essentially similar, security in two different markets for 
advantageously different prices.”  
From the theoretical point of view the cargo diversion or arbitraging 
between different regional gas markets can be approached from the Law of 
one Price (LOP). When LOP holds there are no profitable strategies that are 
possible to exploit for any of the participants in the market. Cournot explained 
the LOP as commodity flow from the market where it has less value to the 
market where its higher valued, “until this difference in value, from one 
market to the other, represents no more than the cost of transportation”. 
(Cournot, 1838, p.117; Finnema & Haugen, 2014) According to Ardeni (1989, 
p.1) : “…it is usually assumed that commodity prices are perfectly arbitraged, 
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at least in the long-run”. It means that price divergence can exist between 
markets time by time, but as soon as the players notice it, the prices are going 
to move towards convergence until they become equal less transportation 
costs.    
While several arbitrage models are explained in Zhuravleva (2009) 
the scope of our model covers committed LNG under the long-term contracts 
(more than four years), where the buyer (hereinafter referred as Initial Buyer) 
acts an arbitrageur or re-seller of the chilled gas cargoes to the independent 
arbitrageur. Notwithstanding that the LNG can be diverted by both seller and 
buyer we approach the issue from buyer’s side. Therefore, two important 
features of our model are the existence of long-term gas sale and purchase 
agreement between the seller (exporter) and the buyer (importer) and the 
capability of the buyer to re-export gas in accordance with contractual terms 
(FOB). FOB contract grants the buyer an ability to exercise destination 
flexibility by means of LNG cargo(es) diversion during the periods of 
substantial price differentials between regional gas markets. We define the 
destination clause as a DES contract concluded between parties to the trade, 
which restricts buyer’s capability for LNG cargo diversion. FOB and DES 
terms are interpreted in accordance with INCOTERMS 2000 of ICC. In our 
model we assume that DES contract completely rules out the possibility of 
negotiation between seller and buyer for re-direction of his supplies to other 
market(s) under existing contract. The reason for making these assumptions is 
impossibility to verify or reject our assumptions due to undisclosed nature of 
the full texts of the long-term liquefied natural gas contracts. Furthermore, we 
93 
 
allow the possibility of the definition of “discharge port” as in the FOB type 
deliveries with modified destination clause (see Table 4.4 for details) or 
possibility of existence of rent sharing provision in FOB contracts because 
both cannot restrict the LNG cargo re-direction, rather legitimize conditions 
for rent sharing in case if the cargo was diverted by the buyer to more 
lucrative market(s). To sum up our model deals with direct diversions when 











Figure 4.6 Initial Buyer acts as arbitrageur
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Our approach is based on the Initial Buyer-Arbitrageur Model.
32
 In 
this model (Figure 4.6) the Initial Buyer decides to divert the cargo to a 
market that offers higher price. There can be two reasons why the Initial 
Buyer decides to divert the LNG vessel: first, the cargo can be replaced by 
cheaper gas from the local gas market or by LNG from the spot market; 
second, the buyer might not need the cargo at the moment (due to 
                                                          
31 Note: Red arrows show the transfer of volume risk. 
32 Note: It is one of the theoretical arbitrage models from Zhuravleva (2009). 













overestimated demand, seasonal demand fluctuations or unforeseen outages). 
(Zhuravleva, 2009) We assume that the contractual clauses allow cargo 
diversion if the trade deal is signed on the FOB delivery basis. The Initial 
Buyer sends the cargo to the End Buyer and may or may not split the profit 
margin conditional on the availability of specific provisions in the existing 
contract. If replacement of the diverted cargo is required it is the Initial 
Buyer’s responsibility. If a destination clause is incorporated into the SPA 
(DES shipping terms), arbitrage by the Initial Buyer will be restricted. 
Furthermore, our approach can comprise Independent Trader – arbitrageur 
model
33
 too. In this model another player appears in the transaction – the 
Independent Trader (see Figure 4.7). Any trading team, bank or individual 
trader can act as an Independent Trader. An Independent Trader buys the 
cargo from the Initial Buyer (who has FOB LTC with the seller) or gets the 
right to divert the cargo to another customer offering higher price. Whether 
the participants split the profit depends on bilateral agreements. If 
replacement of the diverted cargo is required, it also depends on the 
agreement whether the Initial Buyer or an Independent Trader will replace it. 
(Zhuravleva, 2009) This model is related to our model in the sense that the 
Initial buyer, who has the contract with seller, buys the cargo and sells it to 
the Independent Trader, who will divert it to another market. It implies that 
the cargo will reach other than the Initial buyer’s market at the end of the 
arbitraging transaction. 
                                                          
33 Note: It is one of the theoretical arbitrage models from Zhuravleva (2009). 
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We look into the LNG market flexibility approaching from 
perspective of the analysis of the factors that affect the choice of flexible 
destination clause (FOB delivery terms) in the long-term liquefied natural gas 










Figure 4.7 Independent trader acts as arbitrageur
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The destination clause restricting the sale of the LNG can be 
stipulated in the contract in two different forms. The first one can be in the 
form of “territorial restriction clauses (“re-export prohibition”) and 
mechanisms having similar effects. (Frinzio, 2016) Nevertheless, for the first 
type of destination clauses we assume that they are gone. The first reason is 
that such clauses are impossible to incorporate for the supplies intended to the 
mature liberalized markets of the North America, United Kingdom and 
Continental Europe due to the potential breach of competition rules. The 
second reason lies in data availability due to undisclosed nature of LNG 
contracts. Furthermore, the data from EIA (2014) shows that the share of 
                                                          
34 Note: Red arrows show the transfer of volume risk. 
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LNG contracts with destination clauses shrank from 67% to 49%. (see Table 
4.3) The second clue supporting the fact that DES shipping terms act as 
destination clause is that in contracts where LNG is delivered ex ship risks 
and ownership of the cargo passes to the Initial buyer in the destination port. 
However, in the case when the LNG cargo delivery terms has been stipulated 
in the contract as FOB, the risks and liabilities and subsequently the 
ownership of the cargo passes to the Initial buyer at the loading port. This fact 
in our opinion creates a potential for the diversion of the loaded cargo to other 
than Initial buyer’s discharge port if the price spreads between different 
regional markets allow. The LNG cargo(es) can be diverted by the Initial 
buyer himself or sold to the independent arbitrageur who can either buy the 
cargo(es) or divert them on the behalf of the Initial buyer. In this context, 
overestimated demand, seasonal demand fluctuations, unforeseen outages are 
among factors that can motivate the initial buyer for cargo diversion.  To sum 
up, from the Table 4.3 we see that the share of contracts with fixed destination 
clause (67% and 49%) almost coincides with the share of contracts with DES 
(59% and 46%) delivery terms and the share of SPAs with flexible destination 
clause (33% and 51%) coincide with the share of SPAs with FOB (41% and 
54%) delivery terms. Furthermore, we assume that the chilled gas cargoes are 
diverted due to only commercial reason and do not consider the diversion of 
the cargoes for operational reasons e.g. reduction of costs.  
Table 4.3 LNG contracts evolution
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There might be two effects with regards to the LNG cargo diversion 
from the initially intended market:  
 Prices in the Initial Buyer’s market remain stable; 
 Prices in the final buyer’s market might go down affecting the 
revenue flow of the other incumbent supplier(s) deteriorating 
their market share.  
In this stance let’s look into main factors for arbitraging to become a 
reality between different markets and cargo diversion. For this reason in 
addition to our own variables we will utilize and quantify some of arguments 
from theoretical paper by Zhuravleva (2009) in order to quantitatively look 
into determinants for the choice of FOB delivery clauses (flexible destination 
clauses). 
1. Substantial Price Differential between Markets  
Without great enough price spread that allows arbitrageur to profit no 
arbitrage transaction for commercial reasons can occur. (Zhuravleva, 2009) 
The prices in all gas markets increased sharply between 2006 and 
2008 due to tighter market balances for gas and oil in conjunction with higher 
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construction costs associated with price increases for steel and other 
commodities and escalation in labor costs. Subsequently, as a result of 
reduced economic growth associated with the global recession natural gas 
prices went to free fall in 2009. Additionally, the rise in green energy use in 
electricity generation in Europe left unrealized growth in the share of natural 
gas. Finally, the rise in unconventional gas production in North America 
reduced the need for significant LNG imports. All of aforementioned factors 
led to oversupply in the Atlantic Basin. The global recession, with 
concomitant reductions in manufacturing and shipping, further reduced 
demand for both natural gas and oil. Resulting decreases in oil prices (and 
associated oil‐based gas prices) were significant, but not as severe as gas‐on‐
gas price reductions. As a result, Pacific basin prices were roughly twice 
Atlantic basin prices in 2009 creating a substantial arbitrage opportunity. As 
may be expected, during this period global exchange of LNG accelerated, 
notably from the Atlantic basin to the Pacific basin. The year 2010 brought 
greater global economic growth and energy demand, which enabled a rebound 
in oil‐indexed natural gas prices, and cold winter strengthened European 
demand which influenced increases in UK gas‐on‐gas prices. In North 
America, however, shale gas production continued to increase, and natural gas 
prices have stayed relatively low, excepting modest increases in LNG import 
prices which are affected by natural gas prices in other buying regions. In 
2011, the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster caused an increase in Japanese 
LNG imports through the spot market which have increased the average price 
of natural gas in the Asia‐Pacific market. LNG demand exhibits seasonality as 
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demand tends to increase from Japan, Korea, and other Asian markets in 
October and November to replenish inventories before winter heating and 
power demand ramps up. (EIA, 2014) 
Hypothesis 1: Substantial price spreads between markets (North American, 
Asian and European) increases the willingness of parties to conclude 
contracts on the basis of FOB delivery terms. 
2. Importer’s gas self-sufficiency 
The buyers in the markets with no alternative sources of gas (such as 
Japan, Korea or Taiwan) and subsequently with lower self-sufficiency will 
refrain from LNG diversions in order to maintain supply security. On the 
contrary, the European and North American markets with alternative oil-
indexed pipeline gas and domestic production have higher self-sufficiency in 
terms of natural gas.  
Hypothesis 2: Higher self-sufficiency of the importer motivates conclusion of 
contracts with flexible destinations. 
3. The Number of Players in the LNG Market 
As soon as there are more than two buyers in the market an arbitrage 
deal should be potentially possible. The increase in the number of exporters 
and importers has a potential to raise the number of divertible cargoes and 
demand destinations. (Zhuravleva, 2009) For instance, with the development 
of greenfield projects and the deployment of the floating liquefaction 
technologies utilization of the stranded gas became a reality increasing the 
number of gas exporters. At the same time low gas prices allowed new 
importers, particularly those with relatively small and highly price sensitive 
demand to enter the LNG market. Island countries are now able to connect to 
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the LNG market through chartering floating storage and regasification units 
which is substantially cheaper option compared to the construction of onshore 
gas receiving facility.    
Hypothesis 3: The increase in the number of players (exporters and 
importers) in the global LNG market raises the willingness of trade partners 
to agree on contracts with flexible destination clauses. 
4. Availability of Experienced Traders and Specialists 
Like any young and growing market, LNG trading is short of 
experienced brokers and traders. Big companies that possess the assets and 
dominate the market (e.g. Total, Shell, GdF, BP etc.) have very good trading 
teams, but not every company can make this claim. This probably explains 
why so few companies involved in the LNG business practice cargo diversion. 
(Zhuravleva, 2009) 
Hypothesis 4: Availability of experienced team of traders and specialists 
increases the likelihood of the choosing FOB contracts. 
5. Technical Restrictions 
LNG and its infrastructure are far from standardized, and this 
complicates arbitrage to a significant extent. For example, the new mega sized 
Q-Max and Q-Flex tankers having capacities of 261,700 - 266,000 cm cannot 
moor in every LNG receiving terminal. As of January 2017 sixteen different 
import markets (41 out of 114 existing regasification terminals) were known 
to be capable of receiving Q-Max ships. Twenty-two of these terminals were 
located in Asia and Asia Pacific, and none in Latin America or Africa. An 
additional twenty-eight existing regasification terminals are capable of 
receiving Q-Flex vessels (217,000-261,700 cm), as well as conventional 
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carriers. In total, twenty-one out of thirty-four import markets were confirmed 
to have at least one terminal capable of receiving Q-Class vessels. (IGU, 2017) 
Hypothesis 5: The parties to the agreement may take into account technical 
restrictions of the receiving terminals while deciding to choose the flexible 
destination contracts. 
6. Regulatory and Market Restrictions 
Governments and some regulatory institutions impose various 
restrictions and obligations on the gas market players. For instance, 
restructured gas markets strive for third party access to infrastructure. In 
general some regulations may hamper spot trade and arbitrage, but others may 
encourage it. For instance, while the “use-it-or-lose-it” principle in most 
European countries encourages the purchase of spot or diverted cargoes in 
order not to lose the capacity, LNG authorization and vetting processes often 
taking long time may be detrimental for spot and arbitrage transactions. 
Moreover, regulation may become more stringent during periods of high 
demand, preventing the buyer from diverting a cargo to a higher price market. 
(Zhuravleva, 2009) 
It stands to reason that the importer has to possess capacity at a 
regasification terminal, but the existence of a spare regasification capacity 
will not attract a diverted cargo unless a competitive price is offered and 
technical and regulatory restrictions don’t hinder it. Another point is that the 
main challenge for traders is to get access to the regas capacity at the most 
valuable time for this market, which means when demand and price for gas 
are high. Some markets, such as the US, charge high fees for spot cargoes 
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Regulatory and market restrictions certainly influence the arbitrage 
market and slow down its growth however do not prevent buyers from 
looking for opportunities for arbitrage. 
Hypothesis 6: Regulatory and market restrictions are likely to discourage the 
use of FOB delivery terms in the LNG SPAs. 
7. Availability of Shipping Capacity 
Diversion is hardly possible if there is a shortage of shipping capacity 
and carriers have tight schedules. Very often arbitrage implies a longer 
journey and needs spare shipping capacity. An increase in the volume of 
overall LNG trade, usage of vessels for LNG storage and the lengthening of 
marine routes should be taken into account when estimating availability of 
uncommitted shipping capacity. (Zhuravleva, 2009) At present year of 2017 
however there is no shortage in LNG shipping capacity. As of January 2017 
the global LNG shipping fleet consisted of 439 vessels, including 
conventional vessels and ships acting as FSRUs and floating storage units. In 
2016, a total of 31 newbuilds (including two FSRUs) were delivered from 
shipyards, a 7% increase compared to 2015. Relative to the previous year, this 
was a much more balanced addition relative to liquefaction capacity (which 
grew by 35 MTPA). Nevertheless, the accumulation of the tonnage buildout 
from the previous years is still being worked through, keeping short-term 
                                                          
36 Analysis of LNG Arbitrage examines main barriers to developing market, LNG Journal, 




charter rates at historical lows. (IGU, 2017) For instance, average estimated 
spot charter rates for steam vessels fell below $20,000/day for a period of time 
during the year, with rates ultimately averaging ~$20,500/day. Average dual-
fuel diesel electric (DFDE)/ tri-fuel diesel electric (TFDE) day rates dipped to 
~$33,500/day as demand for Atlantic volumes in the Pacific Basin continued 
to decrease, resulting in a more regionalized LNG trade. The continuous wave 
of new builds hitting the market in 2017 will further push the LNG shipping 
market deeper into a period of oversupply, maintaining the current trend for 
spot charter rates in the near term. However, more substantial increase in new 
liquefaction capacity is likely to come online during 2017, which could 
potentially absorb some of the excess capacity. (IGU, 2017) 
Hypothesis 7: The availability of uncommitted shipping capacity motivates 
the parties to the LNG contract to choose the FOB delivery terms to allow 
arbitraging between markets. 
8. Availability of Regasification Capacity 
 Additional capacity coming online in established markets such as 
China, Japan, France, India, Turkey, and South Korea led to an increase in 
global regasification capacity to 794.6 MTPA by the end of January 2017. 
Moreover, 90.4 MTPA of capacity were under construction in the beginning 
of 2017. The expansion of new markets slowed in 2016, as capacity was only 
added in Jamaica – both Colombia and Malta received their initial LNG 
cargoes in 2017. A combined eleven projects are under construction in China 
and India, countries that displayed the strongest LNG demand growth in 2016. 
New entrants are also set to complete regasification projects in the coming 
years, including the Philippines, Bahrain, and Russia (Kaliningrad). 
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Furthermore, the notable fact is that global FSRU capacity reached 83.0 
MTPA since 2015. (IGU, 2017) 
Hypothesis 8: The increase in global regasification capacity raises the 
willingness of the buyer and seller to conclude SPA on the basis of FOB 
delivery terms.  
9. Technological progress  
Another issue is related to the impact of technological change on the 
flexibility of LNG trade. Technological innovation in the exploration and 
production sector has equipped the industry with tools and practices necessary 
to continuously increase the production of natural gas in order to meet rising 
demand. Our focus as in the previous part is on the increase in the capacity of 
the LNG tankers. Therefore, we have chosen the difference in the vessel size 
as a proxy for technological progress. 
It is likely that technological development will result in increased 
supply which can result in more flexible LNG trade. (Niyazmuradov and Heo, 
2017) On the other hand the rush for the development of new projects which 
started during the period of high oil and gas prices led to an increase in overall 
costs, such as steel, labour and construction. In addition to the fact that is that 
up-to-date technologies entail higher costs their adoption requires absence of 
any technical restrictions and full compatibility with existing liquefied natural 
gas infrastructure. Therefore, we state the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 9: Technological progress will affect destination flexibility in the 
LNG trade. 
10. Contract duration  
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The contract duration (CD) is a good proxy for the intensity of the 
relationship between the seller and the buyer (Crocker and Masten, 1988). 
The findings from the empirical studies done in the first part of dissertation 
clearly indicate that after the change of the gas market structure from 
monopolistic to more liberalized institutional framework the average length of 
contracts shortened. Therefore, the buyer is likely to insist on the flexible 
destination cargoes while concluding the SPA with longer duration in order to 
be able to benefit from price arbitraging during the periods of lucrative price 
differentials between regional gas markets. 
Hypothesis 10: The duration of the long-term LNG contract is likely to affect 
the choice of flexible destination clause.   
4.6 INCOTERMS 2000: DES (Delivered Ex-Ship) vs FOB 
(Free on board) 
The Incoterms are predefined rules accepted by governments, legal 
authorities, and practitioners worldwide for the interpretation of most 
commonly used terms in international trade. They set who has to take the cost 
and the risk between the seller and the buyer when trading. It is the 
International Chamber of Commerce who in 1936 (were amended in 
1953, 1967, 1976, 1980, 1990, and 2000) created the terms to make it easier 
to negotiate with foreign companies. The last revised edition was in 2010, 
which has a total of 11 rules (Export.gov, 2014).  
The first version of Incoterms was clearly focused on commodity 
trading and fixed the important delivery points at the ship’s side or the 
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moment when the goods were taken onboard the ship, such as FOB (“Free On 
Board”), CFR (“Cost and Freight”) and CIF (“Cost, Insurance and Freight”). 
Incoterms 1936 contained trade term representing the minimum obligation of 
the seller, namely EXW (“EXWORKS”). At that time the goods were handed 
over to the carrier in so-called container yards or container freight stations. In 
1967, it became necessary to add terms for cases when the seller undertakes 
the delivery of goods to destination. The 1990 revision was triggered by the 
shift from paper documents to electronic communication. Final revision of 
2010 was made because of the need for some clarifications. Indeed, the key 
trade term FOB is understood differently in the United States than in 
Incoterms merely representing a point that could be anywhere. In order to 
achieve an equivalent to FOB under Incoterms, it would be necessary to add 
the word “vessel” after the term FOB. A new trade term which indicates 
appropriate place - DAP (“Delivered at Place”) - has therefore been 
introduced. However, DAP is inappropriate in cases where the goods should 
be made available to the buyer unloaded from the means of transport. 
Therefore, another new term - DAT (“Delivered at Terminal”) - has been 
added to be used for the cases when the unloading of the goods from the 
means of transport should be performed at the seller’s cost and risk. This 
means that the maritime terms DES (“Delivered Ex Ship”) and DEQ 
(“Delivered Ex Quay”) in Incoterms 2000 have been replaced, respectively, 
by DAP and DAT, since the “terminal” in DAT corresponds to the “quay” in 
DEQ where the goods are unloaded from a ship. If the parties continue to use 
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DES or DEQ under Incoterms 2000, the result will be the same as under DAP 
and DAT in Incoterms 2010. (Ramberg, 2011) 
Despite defining appropriate Incoterms by parties disputes might 
nevertheless arise in practice owing to unexpected events that the parties have 
failed to consider in their contract in a clear and conclusive manner. In such 
cases the 1980 UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods (CISG) has now become recognized worldwide, thus contributing 
significantly to transparency and effective dispute resolution in international 
trade. Thus, Incoterms appropriately supplement the CISG and have 
accordingly been endorsed by UNCITRAL. (Ramberg, 2011) 
 




For the sake of our analysis we are going to use  FOB and DES terms 
in accordance with INCOTERMS 2000 interpretation. 
i) FOB – Free on Board (named port of shipment)  
                                                          
37 Source: http://www.dacomacar.ro/en/Useful-info/Legislatie.html 
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FOB contract requires the seller to deliver goods on board a vessel 
that is to be designated by the buyer in a manner customary at the particular 
port. In this case, the seller must also arrange for export clearance. On the 
other hand, the buyer pays cost of marine freight transportation, bill of lading 
fees, insurance, unloading and transportation cost from the arrival port to 
destination. FOB should only be used for non-containerized sea freight and 
inland waterway transport. FOB terms are beneficial to the buyer for several 
reasons: controlling the cargo (possibility for arbitraging), flexibility in 
purchasing LNG from alternate sources in the event of a seller default or  
force majeure. It can also be a benefit to a seller who does not wish to bear the 
risks of a maritime “adventure” or the financial commitment which LNG 
shipping requires. (For details see Appendix A)
38
  
ii) DES – Delivered Ex Ship (port of destination) 
Where goods are delivered ex ship, risk transfer does not occur until 
the ship arrives at the named port of destination and the goods made available 
for unloading to the buyer. In this case the seller pays freight and insurance 
costs and additionally bears risk and title up to the arrival of the vessel at the 
named port. The costs for unloading goods and any duties, taxes, etc. are 
incurred by the buyer. (For details see Appendix A) 
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The use of FOB and DES trade terms in the LNG industry grew out of 
practical experiences among merchants over long periods of time. New LNG 
trade terms will evolve as new experiences are encountered. Nevertheless, 





FOB and DES terms are likely to remain as standard in LNG sales because of 
the relative certainty and comfort they provide. 




(from a 1995 long-term 
Pacific Basin LNG sale 
and purchase agree-
ment) 
FOB-type deliveries with 
modified “destination 
clause” (from a 2005 
long-term Middle East 
LNG sale and purchase 
agreement) 
DES-type deliveries 
(from a 1995 long-term 
Pacific Basin LNG sale 
and purchase agree-
ment) 
The LNG to be sold by 
Seller and purchased by 
Buyer hereunder shall be 
delivered to Buyer at the 
Delivery Point at the 
Loading Port. Delivery of 
LNG shall be deemed 
completed and title to and 
risk of loss of such LNG 
shall pass from Seller to 
Buyer as the LNG passes 
the Delivery Point. As 
used in this agreement, the 
“Delivery Point” means 
the point at the Loading 
Port at which the flange 
coupling of seller’s 
loading line joins the 
flange coupling of the 
LNG loading manifold 
onboard an LNG Tanker. 
[Other provisions allocate 
responsibilities for (i) 
taxes and port charges in 
the loading port 
jurisdiction, (ii) LNG 
tankers (which Buyer 
agrees to provide), (iii) 
operations, etc.] 
 
Title to and risk in LNG 
delivered under this 
Agreement shall pass from 
Seller to Buyer as the LNG 
passes the Delivery Point. 
Buyer shall be responsible 
for the transportation from 
the Delivery Point to the 
Discharge Port of all 
quantities of LNG to be 
sold and purchased under 
this Agreement. As used in 
this Agreement, (i) 
“Delivery Point” means 
the point at which the 
flange coupling of the 
loading line at Seller's 
Facilities joins the flange 
coupling of the loading 
manifold of the LNG 
Vessel, and (ii) “Discharge 
Port” means……….[or an 
alternate port nominated 
by buyer which meets 
certain minimum require-
ments and contains pro-
visions to calculate the 
increase in the delivered 
price of the LNG, if any, 
resulting from delivering 
the LNG to an alternate 
port. The net increase 
would then be shared 
between buyer and seller]  
The LNG to be sold by 
Seller and purchased by 
Buyer hereunder shall be 
delivered to Buyer at the 
Delivery Point. Delivery 
shall be deemed comp-
leted and title and risk of 
loss shall pass from Seller 
to buyer as the LNG re-
aches the Delivery Point. 
As used in this agreement, 
the “Delivery Point” 
means the point at an 
Unloading Port where the 
flange coupling of Buyer's 
unloading line joins the 
flange coupling of the 
LNG discharging mani-
fold on board the LNG 
tanker. [Other provisions 
allocate responsibilities 
for (i) taxes and port 
charges in both the 
loading port and the 
unloading port juris-
dictions, (ii) LNG tankers 
(which Seller agrees to 
provide), (iii) operations, 
etc.] 
                                                          
40 This table is constructed by the author based on Cogan (2007). 
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As we can see from the extracts of real contracts signed in 1995 on 
DES and FOB terms - the Delivery Point defines the concrete place where the 
risks and liabilities for the LNG pass from the seller onto the buyer. However 
in the case of 2005 FOB contract with modified “destination clause” the term 
“Discharge port” is added. Nevertheless, later it continues as: “[or an alternate 
port nominated by buyer…. contains provisions to calculate the increase in the 
delivered price of the LNG….. The net increase would then be shared 
between buyer and seller]”. Therefore, clear identification of the discharge 
port ceases to be the destination clause rather it implies stipulation of a special 
provision in the contract that preconditions profit sharing when the buyer 
decides to divert the cargo to benefit from arbitrage opportunities.  
4.7 Data and methodology 
In this empirical study we utilize the same dataset as in the previous 
part. In our analysis we depart from the point that long-term sale and purchase 
agreements for the liquefied natural gas concluded on FOB (free on board) 
delivery terms contribute to the flexibility of the LNG markets and the global 
gas market as a whole. Therefore we found it interesting to look into the 
determinants that affect the choice of flexible destination delivery terms. 
Chilled gas cargoes divertibility in our opinion will further contribute to the 
moves towards price convergence between regional gas markets and 
potentially may have drastic effects on the market shares of the traditional gas 
exporters. Consequently, the increase in the number of contracts with flexible 
destinations in the LNG trade may have effect on the security of demand of 
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traditional gas exporters, subsequently negatively affecting the revenue flows 
which are used for development needs and fostering economic growth. 
As it was mentioned earlier we approach the chilled gas diversion 
possibility from the buyer’s perspective. The term “buyer” presupposes the 
initial buyer who has a contract with the seller. 
We further recall that LNG SPA contains direct and indirect 
destination clauses. The first one is clearly written clause that prohibits the 
resale of the chilled gas to another buyer by the initial buyer without prior 
permission from the seller and usually through the mechanism of profit share 
and the second one is the use of DES (delivered ex ship) delivery mode from 
ICC’s INCOTERMS that assumes the ownership and all risks related to the 
cargo passes to the buyer when it is unloaded from the vessel in the 
destination port. Of course, the LNG can be re-exported in this case too, but 
the costs of discharging and reloading can be quite substantial and result in 
withering away of the profit margin. 
Owing to the fact that most of the mature restructured markets have 
abolished destination clauses we analyze the determinants of the cargo 
divertibility by means of approaching it from whether the specific liquefied 
natural gas contract is FOB or DES. Therefore, our dummy dependent 
variable is equal to one when the LNG delivery terms in the contracts is 
stipulated as FOB and zero otherwise. The fact that the dependent variable 
chosen is a dummy variable induces us to the use of Linear Probability, Logit 
or Probit Models. The linear probability model is simple to estimate and use, 
but it has some drawbacks. The two most important disadvantages are that 
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fitted probabilities can be less than zero or greater than one and the partial 
effect of any explanatory variable (appearing in level form) is constant. These 
limitations of the LPM can be overcome by using more sophisticated binary 
response models, such as Logit and Probit Models. Moreover, the same issues 
concerning endogenous explanatory variables in linear models also arise in 
logit and probit models. Another possible issue is non-normality of error term. 
Naturally, if e does not have a standard normal distribution, the response 
probability will not have the probit form. Another possible specification 
problem, also defined in terms of the latent variable model, is 
heteroscedasticity in e. If Var(e|x) depends on x, the response probability no 
longer has the form G (𝛽₀+ x𝛽); instead, it depends on the form of the 
variance and requires more general estimation. Such models are not often 
used in practice, since logit and probit with flexible functional forms in the 
independent variables tend to work well. (Wooldridge, 2009) 
Table 4.5 Variables for the empirical analysis 
Dependent Variable: FOB_DUM:    =1 for Contracts signed on FOB terms; 
                                                             = 0 otherwise 
Independent variables: 
LN_REGAS_CAP: = Total regasification 
capacity in the defined year 
YoS: The year in which the 
contract was signed 
TECHNICAL RESTRICTIONS: =1 if the 
importer country has a regasification 
terminal capable of receiving Q-type (Q-
max and Q-flex) tankers 
= 0 otherwise 
CIF_JPN-HH: The difference 
between CIP Japan and Henry Hub 
gas prices 
LN_FLEETCAP: Total LNG tanker 
capacity in the definite year 
CIF_JPN-GER_BOR: The 
difference between CIF Japan and 
German border prices 
AVAILABILITY_OF_EXP_TRADING_
TEAM: =1 when IOCs are party to LNG 
contract (either as buyer or seller) 
= 0 otherwise 
113 
 
GER_BOR-HH The difference 
between German border and Henry 
Hub prices 
LN_Y_VOL: Yearly contracted volume 
CD: Contract duration 
TECH_PROG: The difference between the 
biggest tanker capacity minus average 
tanker capacity in the specific year 
CARGO_RELOAD: =1 if the 
importing country owns at least 
one LNG import terminal with 
cargo reloading facilities 
= 0 otherwise 
LNOIL: Average price for Brent during 
the year the contract was signed 
(USD/bbl.) 
TPA_TO_REGAS: =1 if the 
importer country provides third 
party access at least in one of its 
LNG receiving terminals 
= 0 otherwise 
SELF_SUFF_p: [(domestic gas 
production/ domestic gas 
consumption)]*100: Self-sufficiency rate 
of the gas importing country 
LN_No_of_PLAYERS: The 
number of companies active in the 
LNG markets 
EXP_MIDDLE_EAST: =1 if the exporter 
is located in the Middle East 
=0 otherwise 
IMP_ATL_BASIN: =1 if the 
importer is located in the Atlantic 
Basin 
=0 otherwise 
EXP_ATL_BASIN: =1 if the exporter 
located in the Atlantic Basin 
=0 otherwise 
Instrumental Variables  
LN_T_VOL: Total contracted 
volume 
IMP_TERMINALS: The total number of 
LNG import terminals in the importing 
country in the specific year 
The LNG and global natural gas markets have become more flexible 
as a result of the gas market liberalization processes in the US, UK and 
Continental Europe along with abundant supplies of the blue fuel from the 
North American shale plays and new greenfield undertakings from Australia 
and some other countries. Therefore, we include the (YoS) in order to check 
whether the LNG SPAs signed in the later years are more inclined towards 
incorporation of the flexibility clauses.  
First of all we are going to present the variables related to the choice 
of the flexible destination clause in the contract from the point of view of the 
arbitraging potential between markets. In accordance with the theoretical 
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paper by Zhuravleva (2009) we have constructed and quantified the following 
variables:   
a. The price spread between markets: As we know, presently there are 
three main LNG markets globally: North America, Europe and Asia. 
The former two are usually referred as an Atlantic Basin, while the 
latter one – Pacific Basin. It is the difference across regional gas 
market prices that stimulate the LNG buyers to divert bought 
cargo(es) in case if the price in other market promises good profit 
less transportation costs. Therefore, we define three variables that 
represent the exhaustive set of possible price differentials among 
three main gas markets. As we have mentioned earlier the North 
American gas market is liberalized, mature market with a number of 
hubs well connected to each other through the network of pipelines. 
However, the price in all of those hubs is defined as a differential to 
the Henry Hub located in Louisiana. Moreover, all long-term 
contracts for the sale and purchase of the natural gas are escalated to 
the HH price. Therefore, as in many other studies we have chosen 
the Henry Hub price as a benchmark representing North American 
market prices. Regarding the European market the decision was to 
select the German Border price, which represents the price of the 
imported pipeline gas instead of NBP in UK, because first of all 
unlike UK other parts of Europe still on the way of shifting to more 
liberalized common market. Moreover, long-term contracts for the 
purchase of pipeline gas still dominate the Continental Europe’s 
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market. For the Asia Pacific market or so-called Pacific basin the 
CIF Japan LNG price was chosen as a benchmark. The choice is 
explained by the fact that currently Japan is the biggest LNG 
importer globally and contracts for Pacific Basin have been 
historically pegged to the Japan Crude Cocktail (JCC) - average CIF 
price for imports of crude oil to Japan - price plus a constant to 
reflect freight and other costs. Regarding emerging benchmark, 
Platts began assessing LNG spot price, Japan Korea Marker (JKM), 
on February 2, 2009. However we use the data spanning from 1960s, 
therefore CIF Japan prices are deemed to be more representative for 
the current analysis. The reason for the inclusion of the three price 
differential variables lies in the willingness to find out which among 
three spreads of three different regional LNG markets have played 
significant role in the choice of the FOB contracts: 
i. CIF_JPN-HH: The difference between annual average CIP 
Japan and Henry Hub gas prices; 
ii. CIF_JPN-GER_BOR: The difference between annual 
average CIF Japan and German border prices; 
iii. GER_BOR-HH: The difference between annual average 
German border and Henry Hub prices; 
b. Importer’s gas self-sufficiency: The variable SELF_SUFF_p is 
added to the analysis.  In our opinion the higher self-sufficiency of 
the importer country adds up to its capability of LNG cargo 
diversion. Furthermore, usually, the gas importing countries tend to 
116 
 
contract higher volumes than the country’s real gas demand in order 
to be able to take control of unpredictable demand. 
c. Number of players in the LNG market: In recent years, the number 
of natural gas market players has been increasing and spot market 
volumes have been growing. (EIA, 2014) As LNG is a very capital 
intensive industry involving huge investments in gas production, 
transportation, liquefaction, shipment and regasification, it has high 
entry barriers. Another important issue is the access to the gas 
resources and traditional point-to-point nature of long-term contracts 
with dedicated ships haven’t granted opportunity to outsiders to 
enter the market. Therefore, naturally the number of players has not 
been significant. But increasing wave of gas market liberalization 
requiring the provision of third party access and abundant gas 
supply thanks to the technological development led to steady rise in 
the number of the players. The higher number of players decreases 
the supplier switching costs. To sum up, in this context we are 
interested in revealing whether the decrease in supplier switching 
costs have affected the choice of looser contracts in terms of final 
destination. Therefore we have added the count variable 
LN_No_of_PLAYERS.  
d. Availability of experienced traders and specialists: The diversion of 
the cargo even in the case of availability of lucrative price spreads is 
not an easy task. The LNG market is a young and developing market 
and therefore there might be a shortage of experienced traders and 
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brokers and for the time being can be handled only by the oil and 
gas majors with big and highly experienced team of marketers who 
has wide networks within the market and able to find in a timely 
manner the buyer in the other more lucrative market(s), negotiate the 
deal and exercise it. (Zhuravleva, 2009) Therefore, the dummy 
variable AVAILABILITY_OF_EXP_TRADING_TEAM is 
incorporated to the analysis to check the contribution of the 
existence of big IOCs with highly experienced teams to the 
flexibility of LNG trade. 
e. Technical constraints:  It is not possible to charter or buy LNG 
vessel which is compatible with all or even most of regasification 
terminals due to little standardization between LNG projects around 
the world. (Kwok, 2012) We chose to approach technical 
restrictions issue from the ship-shore compatibility aspect. As we 
have pointed out previously less than one-third of existing terminals 
are able to receive Q-type chilled gas tankers. Therefore, we 
incorporate the dummy variable TECHNICAL RESTRICTIONS in 
order to reveal the effect of technical restrictions on the flexibility of 
the LNG trade.  
f. Regulatory and market restrictions: Absence of the third party 
access to the gas infrastructure is detrimental to the competition in 
the gas supply and trade. Liberalized markets strive for non-
discriminatory access to LNG regasification plants, however few 
markets are liberalized. Furthermore, access to arbitrage 
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opportunities is limited by the prevalence of restrictive terms in long 
term contracts; supply chain limitations; and national policies that 
limit imports and exports. National‐level export limits for natural 
gas can promote divergence in global prices. National‐level 
limitations on the importation of natural gas may be explicitly 
established as a numeric limit, or implicitly established through 
tariffs, a concerted avoidance of LNG import terminal development, 
or discriminatory access to the national natural gas infrastructure. At 
the global level, import limits restrict arbitrage opportunities. While 
this does not prevent convergence to “one price” with respect to 
international trades, it does send a market signal of lower demand 
from the nations that impose these restrictions. (EIA, 2014) 
Therefore, the dummy variable TPA_TO_REGAS will enable to 
reveal the effect of third party access to the regasification terminals 
on the flexibility of LNG trade. 
g. The rise in LNG tanker fleet: When LNG import capacity is 
available the receipt of short‐term and spot trades may be limited by 
the global LNG carrier (LNGC) fleet. Historically, the LNGC fleet, 
like LNG production capacity, has been developed by securing long‐
term contracts for service prior to final investment decisions and the 
typical 2 to 3 year construction period, leaving very little shipping 
capacity for short term and spot market trades. In recent years, an 
increasing number of LNGCs have been available for short term and 
spot trades. Therefore, the variable LN_FLEETCAP is added into 
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the analysis in order to check the effect of abundance of 
uncommitted LNG tankers on the choice of flexible destination 
clause in the chilled gas LTCs. 
h. The rise in regasification capacity: The number of regasification 
terminals is increasing with the rise in the number of new chilled gas 
importers and expansion in the traditional importer countries. While 
liquefaction terminals tend to have high utilization rates, the 
regasification terminals can work with lower ones in comparison as 
a result of the fact that they are used by importer countries as the 
leverage for the diversification of the fuel supply and subsequently 
energy security. Nevertheless, in the periods of lucrative prices in 
the specific regional market there will be many market players who 
are willing to divert extra volumes to earn extra rents. Therefore, we 
include the variable LN_REGAS_CAP with the logic that the more 
is the regasification capacity globally the higher the foresight by the 
potential arbitrageur to select the delivery mode FOB in the contract 
that will not restrict the cargo diversion. 
Furthermore we found it useful to add the following variables to 
check their relationship to the flexibility in LNG trade: 
i. Contract duration: The longer the length of the contracts the higher 
might be the willingness to choose more flexible destination clauses 
as buyer’s insist on flexibility in terms of diversion as an exchange 
for their lock into 20 + years contracts.  
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j. Technological progress: We have chosen the deviation between the 
maximum capacity and the average capacity of the tankers serving 
LNG trade lanes in the year observed as a proxy for technological 
change. As more recent additions to the fleet demonstrate a bias 
toward vessels with larger capacities we are interested in the effect 
of the technological progress (LN_TECH_PROG) in the LNG 
industry on the choice of the flexible destination clause.  
Some of the LNG importers own cargo reloading facilities. From one 
point of view it is likely to make them indifferent in terms of the choosing 
between FOB or DES contracts because they retain a capability to 
immediately reload the imported cargo to the other chartered tanker and send 
to different market on demand. On the other hand, the reloading process is 
costly and requires significant price differentials in order to profit after 
recouping incurred costs. Furthermore, the reloading process can take time 
and requires spare space in the buyer’s import terminal storage. Consequently, 
we incorporated the variable CARGO_RELOAD to check whether the 
availability of the reloading facilities by the importer country has an effect on 
the flexibility of the LNG trade. According to IGU, as of January 2017 the 
total number of terminals able to reload cargoes was 23 in 13 different 
countries.  
Given the traditional oil price indexation of LTC’s (usually several 
months) a higher oil price might provide disincentives for the buyer to enter 
into a long-term contract. Therefore, we include dummy variable (LNOIL) 
representing oil price prevailing in the year of contract signature. 
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The relationship between yearly contracted volumes (LN_Y_VOL) 
and the choice of the destination clauses is not clear ex-ante. We expect that 
the contracts with higher annually contracted volumes are less prone to the 
inclusion of the flexible destination delivery terms, as the country which has 
higher annual contracted volume usually has the task of satisfying bigger 
demand than the countries that have rather small yearly import volumes 
regarding the specific contract. We suspect that this variable can be 
endogenous. Therefore, we include two instrumental variables: Total 
contracted volume (LN_T_Vol) and IMP_TERMINALS in order to conduct 
instrumental variable probit regression (probit regression with endogenous 
covariates).  
After performing probit regression with endogenous covariates in 
STATA 12.0 statistical package Wald test have shown the existence of 
endogeneity. Furthermore, we went further by performing Hausman like test 
to compare the models: probit and probit with endogenous covariates (IV 
probit) and found that two models differ from each other. The null hypothesis 
that two models are identical was rejected. As a result we report instrumental 
variable probit regression results for our model.  
4.8 Empirical results 
Regarding our first hypothesis the estimation shows mixed results. While for 
the price spreads between Japan CIF & German Border Price; German Border 
Price & Henry Hub came in line with expectation, the result for the pair of 
Japan CIF & Henry Hub discovered to be with negative sign. It can be 
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explained by the fact that Japan and North America (until the trigger of high-
scale unconventional gas development and production) traditionally have 
played a role of leading importers with significant demand. However, in 
North America domestic gas production is available which is not true for the 
Japan – the country totally dependent on LNG imports in terms of gas. 
Consequently, the relative rise in price spread usually occurred due to the 
inflation of prices in the North East Asia rather than North America. 
Therefore, the North East Asian importers might wanted to secure supplies 
and were less prone to allow cargoes to go to other destinations during the 
periods of high price spreads. As we have explained earlier there is a dynamic 
system of the gas trade between Continental Europe and North America as 
both of the Continents retain flexibility from pipeline gas imports. As a result 
each market might be closely watching the price differential dynamics 
between Europe and US in particular in order to benefit from lucrative spreads. 
Surprising results came up with regards to the variables: YOS, 
LN_TECH_PROG and LN_REGAS_CAP. The results showed that the later 
the date of the contract signature the more likely the trade partners to choose 
the DES shipping clause. The LNG industry is quite young and most of the 
investments have been done in recent two decades, therefore the parties may 
have been willing to recoup investments and most of the contracts are still far 
from the date of expiry when they can be renegotiated on more flexible 
shipping terms. The technological progress requires huge investment and it is 
happening simultaneously with the development of global LNG industry. Big 
investments require the risk share among importer and exporter to ensure the 
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demand for sellers and prices for buyers. Furthermore, investing party strives 
for the market share in the importer’s country. The same worries about the 
defending their market share may be in the heads of the incumbent 
wholesalers in the countries offering the third party access to the 
regasification infrastructure. Furthermore third party access is usually 
provided in the countries with around 90% gas import dependence. The same 
arguments may serve as an explanation of the result for LN_REGAS_CAP. It 
is only recently we saw the increase in the number of terminals functioning on 
a tolling basis but in the beginning decades of the LNG industry most of the 
terminals have had almost the same demand as the plant capacity. Finally, it 
might be an evidence of the fact that an increase in the number of players 
(both exporters and importers) is more important in the LNG industry rather 
that the expansion in regasification capacity alone.       
 Each new player in the LNG market is likely to increase the 
probability of FOB contract choice by 113.43% in the chilled gas trade deals. 
The emergence of new nodes in the LNG trade network decreases the 
switching costs and increases the number of exporters and importers. 
Surprisingly, the software output shows that buyers owning LNG reloading 
terminals understand better than others significant costs related to the reloads 
and probably resort to reloading only in the cases of extreme price 
differentials. Therefore, they are 54.35% likely to resort to FOB contract 
compared to DES. Regarding the technological progress the findings indicate 
that the parties to the long-term SPA are 118.87% less likely to choose the 
destination flexibility whenever they invest in new technologies in order to 
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monetize the gas resources as LNG. It might be related to the willingness to 
spread market risks and avoid opportunistic behavior by non-investing party 
until the investment is recouped.  
Interesting results came up regarding the effect of contract duration to 
the choice of flexible destination terms. The longer the duration of the 
contract the more is the willingness to agree on FOB delivery terms. The 
lower transaction frequency decreases the risks of the opportunistic behavior 
and mutual trust can be built during the period of the contract validity. 
Another point is the fact that currently there are plenty of investments in the 
greenfield projects in a number of destinations globally. As we have 
mentioned in the previous sections long-term contracts with rigid terms such 
as “take or pay” and destination clauses act as filter for entrants with 
greenfield projects. It means that in the current market where the contract 
durations have become comparatively shorter, market players are more prone 
to pursue the flexible destination clauses that will allow them to benefit from 
arbitraging between markets conditional on lucrative price spreads when they 
are bound by longer term SPAs. 
It is natural that the cargo diversion process is not an easy task and 
requires experienced staff. The results indicate that the availability of 
experienced traders increases the probability of going into FOB contracts by 
17.28%. At the same time technical restrictions such as ship-shore 
compatibility decrease the probability of flexible shipping terms by 76.35%.  
We found that the increase in the LNG tanker fleet size and the self-
sufficiency level of the importing country has a positive effect on the choice 
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of FOB contracts. However, the oil price increase decreases the willingness of 
the trading partner to go into FOB contracts. During those periods importers 
maybe busy on securing volumes rather than thinking of re-direction of future 
supplies. 
Finally the exporters located in the Atlantic Basin and in the Middle 
East are more prone to the choice of FOB contracts compared to the sellers in 
the Pacific Basin. It may imply that LNG exporters from the Pacific Basin are 
more inclined to ensure supply security and it is true that they usually offer 
higher rents compared to the other regional markets. Importers in the Atlantic 
Basin are having flexibility from pipeline supplies are open for the FOB 
contracts allowing LNG diversion compared to the buyers located in the 
Pacific Basin.   
Table 4.6 Empirical results 
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No. of observations 181  
Probability of correctly predicted 85.64%  
Wald chi2 89.44  
Pseudo R2 0.704041  
***, **, * denote P-values less than 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively. Heteroscedasticity robust standard 
errors are in parenthesis. 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors were used in this analysis. 
                                                          
41 The Pseudo R-squared was calculated in accordance with Mc Fadden (1974):  1- (log 
likelihood from the model/log likelihood from the model with only constant) = 1- (-56.441128/-




The flexibility has been brought by the possibility of the cargo diversion may 
largely affect the status quo of long-term gas contracts in the future.  
As we have seen even if markets create conditions for cargo diversion, 
it will be unrealistic unless contractual clauses allow it. Destination clauses 
and ex-Ship arrangements (DES) make arbitrage almost impossible, with rare 
exceptions (outages or other exceptional cases).  
After disputes (when a buyer’s market emerged) some suppliers 
permitted cargo redirection but only if the profit from arbitrage was shared. 
Contractual limitations are likely to be relaxed in the future. The reason for 
this is that buyers may be unwilling to automatically extend existing contracts 
without inclusion of greater flexibility. New liquefaction capacity is coming 
on stream in the near future and softening in demand growth rate gives buyers 
the expectation of increased influence. This should facilitate more flexible 
position on destination clauses and diversion flexibility. 
As we have seen from the results, self-sufficiency of the importer 
countries, price spreads among North East Asian and North American markets 
and between Henry Hub and German Border prices, an increase in the number 
of LNG market players, third party access to the regasification plants and rise 
in the chilled gas tanker fleet and availability of the experienced trading team 
increases the probability of the choosing FOB contracts, allowing the cargo 
diversion among markets. Of course the flexibility in this context may not be 
high enough presently, however with the arrival of new supplies from U.S and 
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Australia as well as many other greenfield projects it is likely to be quite 
significant and capable of altering the status quo in the global natural gas 
industry. Furthermore, the technological development in the field of 
unconventional gas production in the North America can have a spillover 
effect for other traditional importers possessing huge reserves of the shale gas. 
Utilizing the same methods they might increase their natural gas self-
sufficiency or even some of them can become future exporters of blue fuel.  
The differences in the pricing mechanisms and the nature of the different 
regional markets will enable LNG cargo diversion - sometimes higher 
volumes in the other times much lower volumes - depending on the demand 
and supply shocks. Another point is that the number of importers and 
exporters started to increase recently. If previously extremely costly chilled 
gas infrastructure was the main barrier to enter into the market nowadays with 
the emergence of floating LNG technologies such as FSRU it became cheaper 
to export and import gas and utilize stranded resources. For instance, floating, 
storage and regasification units can be chartered from shipping companies for 
the period of 10+ years saving funds and time for the potential LNG importers 
compared to the lengthy approval periods and cost of onshore regasification 
facilities. Looking into the future - at least the short- and medium-term - this 
trend is likely to be persistent. With the increasing surge for market 
liberalization as in traditionally significant LNG markets such as Continental 
Europe, Japan and probably China and India in the longer-term third party 
access to the chilled gas terminals is going to increase.  Finally, as the LNG 
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market grows the extent of the experience in the cargo re-direction will be 
increasing as well.  
To sum up, gas exporting countries should take into account the effect 
of aforementioned factors to the flexibility of the LNG trade in order to able 
to plan future cash flows, foster security of demand and think of the 
diversification strategies in order to complement long-term contracts in the 




















PART IV CONCLUSION 
Chapter 5 Conclusion and Policy Implications 
5.1 Conclusion 
This dissertation investigates the evolution of the long-term natural gas trade 
contracts in the changing industry environment. In this context we have 
looked into the effect of changing gas industry and market environment 
variables on the duration of pipeline gas and LNG contracts and factors 
affecting the choice of flexible destination clauses inherent in liquefied natural 
gas long-term contracts. 
The results of our empirical studies conducted in the first part of the 
dissertation show that contracts for the sale and purchase of the natural gas 
have become shorter in duration since the trigger of gas market liberalization 
in Continental European Markets. Furthermore, the pipeline gas trade deals 
concluded during the period of the economic recession tend to be shorter, 
while chilled gas SPA’s longer. Moreover the longer is the LNG trade 
contracts the more flexible they are, while technological progress and the 
increase in the chilled gas tanker fleet has a negative effect on the duration of 
the liquefied natural gas sale and purchase agreements.  
Other findings indicate: 
Pipeline gas contracts: 
 If the pipeline gas importer or exporter is located in the competitive 
gas markets the length of the contracts tend to be shorter on average;  
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 Another striking point is that the only Norway’s contracts tend to 
longer on average among European gas producers; 
 An increase in the oil price is likely to affect negatively the length of 
the LTC’s; 
 The gas export contracts of Turkmenistan are more than 6 years 
longer on average; 
 Gas contracts for Europe are one year shorter, while gas export deals 
with China and India are longer on average; 
 The total contracted volume positively effects the duration of 
contracts; 
 The later the conclusion date the shorter the contract length. 
LNG contracts: 
 The total contracted volume positively effects the duration of 
contracts; 
 The growth in global gas consumption positively affects the length 
of LNG trade deals; 
 When the buyer is located in China, Japan, Korea or Taiwan the 
contract  duration tend to be longer, however shorter in the case of 
exports to the competitive markets of UK or US; 
 The export deals of Qatar tend to be longer on average. 
All contracts: 
 The later the conclusion date the shorter the contract length; 




 Continental exporters’ contracts are longer on average compared to 
the exporters located in the competitive gas market; 
 Importers in China and India  offer longer purchase deals compared to 
buyers located in competitive markets. 
The results of the statistical analyses in the second part of the 
dissertation indicate the following outcomes in terms of the factors affecting 
the destination flexibility in LNG contracts. In this context the following 
factors tend to motivate parties to include destination flexibility while 
concluding LNG contract: 
 The more is the yearly contracted volumes the higher is the 
probability of choice of FOB contracts;  
 Availability of experienced trading team; 
 The number of market players; 
 An increase in contract duration; 
 If the exporter is located in the Atlantic Basin; 
 The higher price differentials across markets: North East Asia & 
Continental Europe; and  Continental Europe & North America; 
 The higher the self-sufficiency of the importer the more is the 
willingness to go for flexible contracts. 
Here is the list of factors making the choice of destination clause more likely: 
 An increase in price spread between North East Asia and North 
America; 
 An upward surge in oil prices; 
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 The later the year of signature the more inclination for the choice of 
destination restricted LNG SPA; 
 If the importer is located in the Atlantic basin. 
At the same time current gas industry and market developments can be 
characterized by the following factors and trends: 
 Domestic consumption of the gas producing countries have been 
increasing substantially due to generous subsidies (in some 
countries they were abolished) and is likely to be increasing even 
further thanks to the increase in population and voluntary 
commitments shouldered by those countries on the basis of Paris 
Agreement on climate change; 
 Gas supply glut as a result of heavy investment during the period 
of high oil prices due to producers’ believe in the existence of the 
first mover advantage for instance in the liquefied natural gas 
exports; 
 Expiry of the decades ago concluded long-term contracts, 
opening the window for renegotiation within the present context 
of the ‘buyers’ market’, allowing greater flexibility both in terms 
of volume and length, curtailing or completely removing 
destination clauses and diminishing the minimum take quantities, 
diversification of the supply portfolio by the importers; 
 Arbitrage opportunities evaporated due to the anemic prices in 
almost all the gas markets, price difference hasn’t been wide 
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enough to enable diversion of the cargoes for the more lucrative 
markets; 
 Expansion of the Panama canal has resulted in shorter voyage 
times from the U.S Gulf Coast to the Asian Markets pushing 
down transportation costs; 
 The option of chartering floating regasification and storage unit 
is a likely the trend of the future, being less expensive compared 
to the capital investment related to the erection of the onshore 
regasification terminal. Furthermore, FSRU enabled to bring into 
the market stranded gas and supply small-scale LNG consumers 
as island countries in the Caribbean or huge countries with many 
islands, such as Indonesia, where the construction of pipelines is 
not economically viable and technically difficult; 
 Low oil prices pushed down the investment incentives worldwide 
resulting in the spare workforce and slack equipment opening the 
way to the investors who are willing to invest into new projects 
to make it less costly manner compared to the previous period 
which was distinguished by the surge for LNG capacities 
sometimes as the way to enter the market.  
 Oil and gas companies profits has been curtailed by around 30% 
on average which induced them to perform serious restructuring 
processes to divest into non-core businesses downsizing 
personnel and looking for new business models such as entering 
into and being nimble in international markets; 
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 Stricter marine environmental regulations as those related to cut 
in sulphur emissions have made companies to think of shifting to 
the use of liquefied natural gas as the marine fuel. At the same 
time some countries as Singapore is planning to take the 
advantage of the potential developments by positioning 
themselves as future LNG bunkering hubs through the 
investment in that potentially lucrative sector in the medium-term 
perspective.  
 Natural gas is in the competition with coal the latter is being 
currently cheaper than the former meaning that without stricter 
environmental regulations gas is fated to lose the battle. The 
issue is that as the gas price went down drastically due to the 
widespread unconventional gas development the same fact have 
pushed down coal prices as well due to moving away from coal 
towards gas trends in the countries such as United States 
relieving huge volumes for export for a cheaper than before 
prices. At the same time the coal is more abundant than gas 
worldwide therefore utilizing domestic coal reserves is more 
economical for some countries rather than importing relatively 
expensive gas. 
As we have seen the global gas industry environment has been 
changing in recent decades. So-called oil commodities prices super cycle 
during opened the way for the investment in a variety of new gas projects, 
including the technological breakthrough in terms of gas production from 
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unconventional resources. Technological change have been occurring in the 
liquefied natural gas sector too i.e. the development of floating technologies 
such as FSPO and FSRU which granted the opportunity for the new players, 
especially those having highly price sensitive demand to enter the global  gas 
market either as an exporter or importer.  
To sum up, the results suggest that the duration of the long-term 
contracts will further shorten leaving gas producing countries with the issue of 
searching for and discovering the instruments that are additional or 
complementary to the conclusion of long-term gas sales and purchase 
contracts in terms of planning and ensuring future cash flow stability, 
provision of the demand security for the produced gas, minimizing transaction 
costs for renegotiation and enforcement of long-term contracts and foreseeing 
proper distribution of market risks during planning for new gas infrastructural 
investments. Furthermore, gas exporting countries should take into account 
the effect of aforementioned factors to the flexibility of the LNG trade during 
the process of long-term strategy elaboration. Those factors will continue to 
gain prominence in the long-term affecting the contract duration and 
flexibility of the gas trade. Consequently, gas producing countries might need 
to look for other means of fostering gas demand security which will be 
complementary to resorting to long-term contracts on the way of monetization 
of gas resources. 
Because of data limitation due to the fact that unconventional gas and 
renewable energy productions are comparatively new phenomena when 
compared with pipeline and liquefied natural gas industries we couldn’t 
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incorporate those developments in our analysis. Therefore, they can be a focus 
of future studies. At the same time future research may cover the integrated 
analysis of the gas monetization options in order to formulate possible 
strategies for the gas exporting countries to complement long-term contracts 
on the way of fostering gas demand security. 
5.2 General Policy Implications 
We can define direct and indirect implications from the results of the 
empirical studies. Direct implications from the dissertation findings are: 
 The findings of our empirical studies are in line with (Akhmetov, 
2015). Estimating the gas demand security index (REED) for five 
Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and comparing it with OPEC countries 
the author found that Turkmenistan’s gas demand security is twice 
better. In the same vein, the findings from our model for pipeline gas 
sale and purchase agreements indicate that the contracts concluded 
between Turkmenistan and the importers are on the average 6 years 
longer. It is the sign of good positioning in the short and medium-
term, but in the longer-term perspective overall trend of shortening 
the duration of contracts might affect Turkmen export deals too. 
 The results indicate that the exporters should strive for the conclusion 




 The exporter countries may need to offer some flexible contractual 
terms for gas exports to the markets where liberalization in planned; 
 During the period of economic recession gas exporters should be 
inclined to the conclusion of LNG contracts as they are concluded for 
longer terms compared to pipeline export deals.  
 In terms of the chilled gas export deals exporters should have to offer 
flexibility in terms of destination (ability to re-direct LNG cargoes) in 
order to conclude longer trade deals. It can be done at least in the case 
of markets where their own supplies will not compete with the re-
directed supplies of the buyer. Moreover, they can insist on the 
inclusion of the profit sharing provision in the cases when the buyer 
diverts bought cargo(es) to more lucrative market(s). 
 While the LNG fleet overcapacity maybe a short- or medium term 
event and market will come into balance sooner or later the exporters 
should keep in mind the negative effect of the technological change 
on the chilled gas export contract length. 
 Sellers should strive to export to the markets of China and India 
which have been offering longer term-contracts compared to the 
European market. Nevertheless, the exports to Europe should be 
considered too, but may be in terms of geographical diversification 
rather as primary destination. 
 As the global gas consumption growth increases the contract length 
the exporter should think of other business models for creation of 
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additional gas consumption such the LNG based aviation fuel, ship 
bunkering, chilled gas for transportation etc.  
 LNG exporter should look into the markets of China, Japan, Korea 
and Taiwan which have been offering longer term agreements.   
In accordance with empirical findings in order to foster gas demand 
security by the gas exporting countries it is more favorable to go into 
contracts with longer-term contracts offering markets such as China and India. 
The players in the mature liberalized or on the way of liberalization markets 
of UK, North America and Germany (which represents the state of the gas 
markets in the Continental Europe) offer shorter term contracts because of 
availability of indigenous supplies, both liquefied natural gas and pipeline gas 
options, existence of well-developed or rigorously developing liquid hubs and 
petroleum exchanges where the gas price can be hedged on the basis of the 
futures or forward contracts. Previous papers point out to the importance of 
being available in all of the LNG markets for exporters. In pipeline gas export 
case the geographical diversification is important as well but not always 
technically possible due to the rigid pipeline infrastructure which implies 
usually point-to-point trade or small number of connected nodes if we think of 
the gas trade as a network. 
Overall in the periods of global recession when the commodity prices 
are low producers may think for diversification into the LNG markets as they 
offer longer SPAs. But it will be an option for the producers who retain both 
pipeline and LNG infrastructure. 
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 In addition there are indirect implications from the findings of the 
research. Producers that export the gas in the pipe gas form are usually 
landlocked countries that do not have access to the seas. Therefore, definitely, 
the diversification into liquefied natural gas projects is not their case. 
Recalling economic instruments used by suppliers for the enhancement of the 
gas demand security we remember: owning gas storage facilities, controlling 
transportation routes, trials to offset or correct the changes in the regulation of 
consuming countries, strategy of diversification in terms of export markets, 
energy production, gas processing and export of value-added products and 
diversification away from energy goods.  In this context an option with the 
most potential especially for the developing countries is an export of value 
added products through utilization of different available gas monetization 
options: Gas-to-Gas (pipeline, LNG, CNG), Gas-to-Solids (gas hydrates), 
Gas-To-Liquids (Syngas – diesel, naphta, lubricants, olefins), Gas-to-Power 
(electricity, heat), Gas-to-Chemicals (Ammonia, urea). For instance, 
landlocked gas producing countries can diversify their production to include  
CNG, GTL, Gas-to-Power and Gas-to-Chemicals. In this regard, GTL 
technology providers claim that USD15-USD20 oil price results in profitable 
GTL plant. (Senden & McEwan, 2000; Fleisch, 2000) Furthermore, the 
literature on the development of natural resource rich countries points out to 
the need in investment in education and infrastructure in the earlier periods of 
development. (Van der Ploegh & Venables, 2011; Collier, Van der Ploeg 
Spence & Venables, 2010)  
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The general result of the empirical studies conducted in the 
dissertation points out that the length of the pipeline gas contracts has 
shortened, while in the case of liquefied natural gas contracts when their 
duration is longer they are more flexible. In this context pipeline gas 
exporter(s) can allow more flexibility in their gas export contracts either via 
increasing the flexible volumes available besides take-or-pay volumes, 
removal of destination clauses and only agreeing on some amendments which 
do not allow the importer to re-direct bought gas to the destination (s) where it 
will compete with exporter’s deliveries. Another possibility to allow the 
importer in the periods of low demand to move the some part of annually 
committed offtake volumes through take-or-pay clause to the next period. The 
offtake postponement period can be stipulated in the contract or readiness to 
make an amendment to the contracts in such cases can be incorporated as a 
declaration clause. This point should be considered bilaterally or 
multilaterally - on an international level. The strategy of controlling gas routes 
is widely used by the Russia e.g. the rejection of the third party access to the 
pipeline system in their territory to other producers such as Central Asian 
states which allows them prevention or restriction of the access of the new 
competitors to the European markets. 
In case of availability of the access to the international seas 
diversification into LNG markets would be the best option in accordance with 
the quantitative findings. The results of the empirical studies indicate that if 
exporters wish to conclude longer contracts they need to offer destination 
flexibility to the buyers. Therefore, it is an excellent opportunity for the 
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fostering gas demand security for the former pipeline gas producer tapping 
into longer and more flexible LNG contracts which are better in terms of 
reach to regionally disparate gas markets. Furthermore, presently LNG tanker 
fleet market is oversupplied and charter rates reached historical lows. 
Therefore, there is no anymore need for the purchase of the chilled gas tanker 
for the specific project as it can be easily chartered for any needed period. 
Moreover the liquefied natural gas market entry barriers have become lower 
with the introduction of floating gas production, storage and liquefaction 
technologies.   
 
 
Figure 5.1 Possible gas monetization options. 
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Considering policy implications for LNG exporters they are better 
positioned compared to the pipeline gas exporters in terms of security of their 
gas demand in accordance with the outcomes of the empirical studies. 
Especially, the result related to the contracts concluded during the period of 
recession, when the commodity price trends reached their bottom. The same 
period is observed currently when the anemic prices for the oil and gas affect 
budgets of the gas exporting countries in the worst possible manner. It is in 
line with our findings regarding the effect of the oil price decrease on the 
length of the gas export contracts. On the other hand, natural gas, including 
LNG has good positioning in terms of the environmental friendliness 
compared to oil products, coal etc. Therefore, chilled gas exporters can go for 
the advertisement of using LNG as aviation fuel, a fuel for the road transport 
or ship bunkering. In this context there are a number of projects in terms of 
LNG bunkering and using it as a fuel for ships. Singapore and Korea along 
with Spain are on the forefront of that undertaking.  
The use of natural gas, either pipe form of liquefied for the electricity 
generation is a privileged possibility as it is the way for enhancement not only 
exports but internal economy as well.  
The country should have many possible options for the gas 
monetization in order to be able competitive in terms of exports no matter the 
global or regional economic situation is. In this context the period of low 
commodity prices is an opportunity when the countries can invest heavily into 
the distressed assets while many private or semi-private and even public 
companies disinvest in a number of their relatively non-core assets. 
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Furthermore, the construction materials, labor force costs and service costs are 
decreasing in this period due to anemic functioning of the economies as whole 
and less orders from the oil and gas industries. As getting loans becomes more 
difficult during that period producers can make use of the accumulated funds 
in the sovereign wealth type of funds which are usually in place in every of 
the gas exporting countries. 
Inviting importer or investor for joint exploration and investment and 
maybe even common marketing can be another option for the gas exporting 
countries. In this case the customer is already identified and probably going to 
assist in finding new markets and another potential customers for the sale of 
the share of production.  
5.3 Policy Implications for Turkmenistan  
Based on the findings of the study the following policy recommendations can 
be made for Turkmensitan: 
 Gas may be processed into the aviation fuel to make the country an 
aviation hub at least in the Central Asian region. It’s worth 
mentioning that currently the country is deliberating on the allowing 
the foreign airlines to use airport services and aircraft refueling on 
discounted prices; 
 Natural gas swap agreements with neighboring countries can be used;  
 Biggest chemical and fertilizer producers can be invited to set up their 
production in territory of the country. It would enable the energy 
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diversification of the export, technology transfer and learning 
processes by the domestic specialists; 
 Deliberating and foreseeing the use of underutilized LNG terminals in 
the LNG exporting countries or partnering in the LNG projects with 
other countries. For instance, Iran is planning to use Omani 
liquefaction terminals for the export of the Iranian gas. 
 Energy production in terms of electricity. In this context the country 
is a significant exporter of electricity to the neighboring countries as 
well as to Tajikistan and Turkey; 
 Working together with regional neighbors on the development of gas 
hub which is going to enable exporters to hedge the risks as it is done 
in the mature developed markets of UK and US. For instance in the 
North America they make use of 72 weeks futures contracts in order 
to hedge risks. 
 Conclusion of contracts with importers that offer longer term deals in 
accordance with the findings of our empirical studies. An excellent 
example is planned exports to India through Turkmenistan- 
Afghanistan-Pakistan-India Pipeline (TAPI); 
 Geographical diversification of export markets. In this context, TAPI, 
Nabucco etc. can be a good examples. For instance, lower gas prices 
enabled higher utilization of gas-fired capacity in India and Pakistan 
and boosted incremental demand in China and ASEAN countries.  
 Searching for niche markets and products. 
 Tapping into GTL production.  
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Regarding most of these options the Turkmenistan have been making 
significant efforts in terms of investments. Fertilizer facilities, power plants 
and GTL plants using natural gas as a feedstock has been constructed, 
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Appendix   
A. Comparison of FOB and DES shipping modes in 
accordance with ICC’s INCOTERMS 
Table A1. The rights and obligations of the Seller and the Buyer  
under DES and FOB delivery terms
42
 
DES-Delivered Ex Ship-(named port of 
destination) 
FOB-Free on Board-(named port of 
shipment) 
 
“Ex Ship” means that the seller fulfils his 
obligation to deliver when the goods 
have been made available to the buyer on 
board the ship uncleared for import at the 
named port of destination. The seller has 
to bear all costs and risks involved in 
bringing the goods to the named port of 
destination. This term can only be used 
for sea or inland waterway transport.  
 
“Free on Board” means that the seller 
fulfils his obligation to deliver when the 
goods have passed over the ship’s rail at 
the named port of shipment. This means 
that the buyer has to bear all costs and 
risks of loss or damage to the goods from 
that point. The FOB term requires the 
seller to clear the goods for export. This 
term can only be used for sea or inland 
waterway transport.  
A. The seller must  A. The seller must  
A.1. Provision of goods in conformity 
with the contract  
A.1. Provision of goods in conformity 
with the contract  
Provide the goods and the commercial 
invoice, or its equivalent electronic 
message in conformity with the contract 
of sale and any other evidence of 
conformity which may be required by the 
contract.  
Provide the goods and the commercial 
invoice, or its equivalent electronic 
message, in conformity with the contract 
of sale and any other evidence of 
conformity which may be required by the 
contract.  
A.2. Licences, authorisation and 
formalities 
A.2. Licences, authorisation and 
formalities 
Obtain at his own risk and expense any 
export licence or other official 
authorisation and carry out all customs 
formalities necessary for the exportation 
of the goods and, where necessary, for 
their transit through another country.  
Obtain at his own risk and expense any 
export licence or other official 
authorisation and carry out all customs 
formalities necessary for the exportation 
of the goods.  
A.3. Contract of carriage and insurance  
 
a) Contract of carriage  
 
Contract at his own expense for the 
carriage of the goods by a usual route and 
in a customary manner to the named 
A.3. Contract of carriage and insurance  
 
a) Contract of carriage  
 
No obligation.  
 
                                                          




place at the named port of destination. If 
a point is not agreed or is not determined 
by practice, the seller may select the 
point at the named port of destination 
which best suits his purpose.  
 
b) Contract of insurance  
 
No obligation.  
b) Contract of insurance  
 
No obligation.  
A.4. Delivery  
 
Place the goods at the disposal of the 
buyer on board the vessel at the usual 
unloading point in the named port of 
destination uncleared for import on the 
date or within the period stipulated, in 
such a way as to enable them to be 
removed from the vessel by unloading 
equipment appropriate to the nature of 
the goods.  
A.4. Delivery  
 
Deliver the goods on board the vessel 
named by the buyer at the named port of 
shipment on the date or within the period 
stipulated and in the manner customary at 
the port.  
A.5. Transfer of risks  
 
Subject to the provisions of  B.5., bear all 
risks of loss of or damage to the goods 
until such time as they have been 
delivered in accordance with A.4.  
A.5. Transfer of risks  
 
Subject to the provisions of  B.5., bear all 
risks of loss of or damage to the goods 
until such time as they have passed the 
ship’s rail at the named port of shipment.  
A.6. Division of costs  
 
Subject to the provisions of B.6.  
 
- in addition to costs resulting from 
A.3.a), pay all costs relating to the goods 
until such time as they have been 
delivered in accordance with A.4.;  
 
- pay the costs of customs formalities 
necessary for exportation as well as all 
duties, taxes or other official charges 
payable upon exportation and, where 
necessary, for their transit through 
another country.  
A.6. Division of Costs  
 
Subject to the provisions of B.6. 
 
- pay all costs relating to the goods until 
such time as they have passed the ship’s 
rail at the named port of shipment;  
 
- pay the costs of customs formalities 
necessary for exportation as well as 
duties, taxes and other official charges 
payable upon exportation.  
A.7. Notice to the buyer  
 
Give the buyer sufficient notice of the 
estimated time of arrival of the named 
vessel in accordance with A.4. as well as 
any other notice required in order to 
allow the buyer to take measures which 
are normally necessary to enable him to 
take the goods.  
A.7. Notice to the buyer  
 
Give the buyer sufficient notice that the 
goods have been delivered on board.  
A.8. Proof of delivery, transport 
document or equivalent electronic 
A.8. Proof of delivery, transport 





Provide the buyer at the seller’s expense 
with the delivery order and/or the usual 
transport document (for example a 
negotiable bill of lading, a non-
negotiable sea waybill, an inland 
waterway document, or a multimodal 
transport document) to enable the buyer 
to take delivery of the goods.  
 
Where the seller and the buyer have 
agreed to communicate electronically, the 
document referred to in the preceding 
paragraph may be replaced by an 
equivalent electronic data interchange 
(EDI) message.  
message  
 
Provide the buyer at the seller’s expense 
with the usual document in proof of 
delivery in accordance with A.4.  
 
Unless the document referred to in the 
preceding paragraph is the transport 
document render the buyer, at the latter's 
request, risk and expense, every 
assistance in obtaining a transport 
document for the contract of carriage (for 
example, a negotiable bill of lading, a 
non-negotiable sea waybill, an inland 
waterway document, or a multimodal 
transport document).  
 
Where the seller and the buyer have 
agreed to communicate electronically, the 
document referred to in the preceding 
paragraph may be replaced by an 
equivalent electronic data interchange 
(EDI) message. 
A.9. Checking-packaging-marking  
 
Pay the costs of those checking 
operations (such as checking quality, 
measuring, weighing. counting) which 
are necessary for the purpose of 
delivering the goods in accordance with 
A.4.  
 
Provide at his own expense packaging 
(unless it is usual for the particular trade 
to deliver the goods of the contract 
description unpacked) which is required 
for the delivery of the goods. Packaging 
is to be marked appropriately.  
A.9. Checking-packaging-marking 
 
Pay the costs of those checking 
operations (such as checking quality, 
measuring, weighing, counting) which 
are necessary for the purpose of 
delivering the goods in accordance with 
A.4.  
 
Provide at his own expense packaging 
(unless it is usual for the particular trade 
to ship the goods of the contract 
description unpacked) which is required 
for the transport of the goods, to the 
extent that the circumstances relating to 
the transport (e.g. modalities, destination) 
are made known to the seller before the 
contract of sale is concluded.  
 
Packaging is to be marked appropriately.  
A.10. Other obligations  
 
Render the buyer at the latter’s request, 
risk and expense, every assistance in 
obtaining any documents or equivalent 
electronic messages (other than those 
mentioned in A.8.) issued or transmitted 
in the country of dispatch and/or of origin 
which the buyer may require for the 
A.10. Other obligations 
 
Render the buyer at the latter’s request, 
risk and expense, every assistance in 
obtaining any documents or equivalent 
electronic messages (other than those 
mentioned in A.8.) issued or transmitted 
in the country of shipment and/or of 
origin which the buyer they require for 
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importation of the goods.  
 
Provide the buyer, upon request, with the 




the. importation of the goods and, where 
necessary, for their transit through 
another country.  
 
Provide the buyer, upon request, with the 
necessary information for procuring 
insurance.  
B. The buyer must  B. The buyer must  
B.1. Payment of the price  
 
Pay the price as provided in the contract 
of sale.  
B.1. Payment of the price  
 
Pay the price as provided in the contract 
of sale.  




Obtain at his own risk and expense any 
import licence or other official 
authorisation and carry out all customs 
formalities necessary for the importation 
of the goods.  




Obtain at his own risk and expense any 
import licence or other official 
arthorisation and carry out all customs 
formalities for the importation of the 
goods and where necessary. for their 
transit through another country.  
B.3. Contract of carriage  
 
No obligation.  
B.3. Contract of carriage  
 
Contract at his own expense for the 
carriage of the goods from the named 
port of shipment.  
B.4. Taking delivery  
 
Take delivery of the goods as soon as 
they are placed at his disposal in 
accordance with A.4.  
B.4. Taking Delivery  
 
Take delivery of the goods in accordance 
with A.4.  
B.5. Transfer of risks  
 
Bear all risks of loss or damage to the 
goods from the time they have been 
placed at his disposal in accordance with 
A.4. provided, however, that the goods 
have been duly appropriated to the 
contract, that is to say, clearly set aside or 
otherwise identified as the contract 
goods.  
 
Should he fail to give notice in 
accordance with B.7., bear all risks of 
loss of or damage to the goods from the 
agreed date or the expiry date of the 
period stipulated for delivery.  
B.5. Transfer of risks  
 
Bear all risks of loss of or damage to the 
goods from the time they have passed the 
ship’s rail at the named port of shipment.  
 
Should he fail to give notice in 
accordance with B.7., or should the 
vessel named by him fail to arrive on 
time, or be unable to take the goods, or 
close for cargo earlier than the stipulated 
time, bear all risks of loss of or damage 
to the goods from the agreed date or the 
expiry date of the period stipulated for 
delivery provided, however, that the 
goods have been duly appropriated to the 
contract, that is to say, clearly set aside or 




B.6. Division of costs  
 
Pay all costs relating to the goods 
including unloading from the time they 
have been placed at his disposal in 
accordance with A.4., provided, however, 
that the goods have been appropriated to 
the contract, that is to say, clearly set 
aside or otherwise identified as the 
contract goods.  
 
Should he fail to take delivery of the 
goods when they have been placed at his 
disposal in accordance with A.4., or to 
give notice in accordance with B.7., bear 
all additional costs incurred thereby.  
 
Pay all duties, taxes and other official 
charges as well as the costs of carrying 
out customs formalities payable upon 
importation of the goods.  
B.6. Division of costs  
 
Pay all costs relating to the goods from 
the time they have passed the ship’s rail 
at the named port of shipment.  
 
Pay any additional costs incurred, either 
because the vessel named by him has 
failed to arrive on time, or is unable to 
take the goods, or will close for cargo 
earlier than the stipulated date, or 
because the buyer has failed to give 
appropriate notice in accordance with 
B.7. provided, however, that the goods 
have been duly appropriated to the 
contract, that is to say, clearly set aside or 
otherwise identified as the contract 
goods.  
 
Pay all duties, taxes and other official 
charges as well as the costs of carrying 
out customs formalities payable upon 
importation of the goods and, where 
necessary, for their transit through 
another country.  
B.7. Notice to the seller  
 
Whenever he is entitled to determine the 
time within a stipulated period and/or the 
place of taking delivery, give the seller 
sufficient notice thereof.  
B.7. Notice to the seller  
 
Give the seller sufficient notice of the 
vessel name, loading point and required 
delivery time.  
B.8. Proof of delivery transport document 
or equivalent electronic message  
Accept the delivery order or the transport 
document in accordance with A.8.  
B.8. Proof of delivery, transport 
document or equivalent electronic 
message  
 
Accept the proof of delivery in 
accordance with A.8.  
B.9. Inspection of Goods  
 
Pay, unless otherwise agreed, the costs of 
pre-shipment inspection except when 
mandated by the authorities of the 
country of exportation.  
B.9. Inspection of goods 
 
Pay, unless otherwise agreed, the costs of 
pre-shipment inspection except when 
mandated by the authorities of the 
country of export.  
B.10. Other obligations  
 
Pay all costs and charges incurred in 
obtaining the documents or equivalent 
electronic message mentioned in A.10. 
and reimburse those incurred by the 
seller in rendering his assistance in 
accordance therewith.  
B.10. Other obligations  
 
Pay all costs and charges incurred in 
obtaining the documents or equivalent 
electronic messages mentioned in A.10. 
and reimburse those incurred by the 
seller in rendering his assistance in 






변화하는 산업 환경에서의 장기 
천연 가스 계약의 진화 
 
 





본 논문의 목적은 국제적으로, 그리고 지역적으로 진행되고 있는 
천연가스 계약방식의 변화에 초점을 맞추어 이러한 장기계약의 진화적 
측면에서 변화의 특성을 분석하고 천연가스산업의 발전과 천연가스 
수입 및 수출국가에 영향을 미칠 가능성에 대하여 접근하여 조사하였다. 
이 논문은 두 편의 essay로 구성된다. 2SLS, GMM, LIML과 같은 
도구 변수 방법을 사용하는 첫 번째 essay는 시장 규제 완화, 기술 변화, 
LNG 탱커 함대 용량 증가, 천연 가스 판매 및 구매 계약 기간에 대한 
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세계 경제 침체 등 효과의 분석을 통해 장기 계약의 진화를 경험적으로 
탐구한다. 
세 가지 모델을 분석에 사용하였다. 첫 번째 모델은 pipeline gas 
계약을 분석하고 두 번째 모델은 liquefied natural gas 계약을 조사하고 
마지막 모델은 두 계약과 다루고 있다. 요약하자면 전반적인 결과는 
위에 언급한 요인 및 사건의 발생으로 계약 기간이 평균적으로 감소하는 
경향이 있음을 나타낸다. 유일한 요점은 세계 경기 침체 기간 동안 
체결된 LNG 계약은 평균적으로 더 길지만 그 동시에 보다 유연한 
경향이 있다는 것이다. 
두 번째 essay 에서는 Probit model with endogenous covariate 를 
사용하여 장기적인 액화천연가스(LNG) 판매-구매 계약서에서 유연한 
목적지 조항의 선택에 대한 결정 요인 분석을 통해 liquefied natural 
gas 화물 re-direction 의 가능성으로 가져 오는 LNG 시장과 무역 
유연성을 탐구하였다.  목적지 조항을 냉장 가스의 판매자(수출국)와 
구매자 (수입국) 사이에 체결된 계약서에서 규정된 DES delivery 
terms 으로 정의했다. 따라서 오늘날 FOB 계약의 선택에 있어 글로벌 
가스 시장 및 특히 LNG 시장에서 널리 퍼져있는 요인을 분석하였다. 
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결론적으로, 연구의 결과는 현재의 액화천연가스(LNG)시장, 
산업 및 해당 밸류체인(value chain)에서 분석한 요인의 대부분과 진행 
상황은 유연한 계약 방식의 선택 쪽으로 긍정적인 영향을 미친다는 것을 
뚜렷이 보여주고 있다. 또한, 이러한 추세는 중장기 적으로 지속될 
가능성이 높으며, 이는 LNG 무역의 전반적인 유연성에 기여하며, 
글로벌 가스 시장의 전반적인 유연성에 영향을 미칠 것으로 보인다. 
천연가스 거래에서 장기계약을 활용하는 대다수의 천연가스 수출국 및 
수입국의 전략수립 과정에 본 연구의 정량적 분석결과를 사용할 수 있을 
것이다.  
 
키워드 : 천연 가스; LNG; 장기 계약, 목적지 조항, 기술적 변화, 
(transaction cost)거래 비용, 가스 수요 보장. 
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